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 THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTOR STATE 
DISPUTES AND CHINA: NEW 
DEVELOPMENTS ON ICSID JURISDICTION 
 
Jane Y. Willems
*
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The ICSID Convention of 1965
1
 created the International Centre 
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) as an arm of the 
World Bank.  ICSID offers a venue for the resolution of legal disputes 
between foreign investors and host states, providing an alternative to 
the courts or administrative tribunals of the host state.
2
 As of May 5, 
2011, 157 states had signed the Convention and 147 States had 
deposited their instruments of ratification.
3  
China signed the ICSID 
Convention on February 9, 1990, ratified it on July 1, 1992
 
and 
deposited its instruments of ratification on January 7, 1993.
4
 The ICSID 
Convention entered into force for China on February 6, 1993.
5
 
ICSID originally heard contract based investment disputes 
between foreign investors and host states.  In the 1990s, the ICSID 
experienced a multiplier effect in new arbitration filings. ICSID’s 
growth in arbitration cases is due to the emergence and dramatic 
                                                 
* Jane Y. Willems is a Visiting Fellow at the City University of Hong 
Kong, School of Law. Ms. Willems is a French Avocat and a Member of the 
Bar of California. 
1 The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of Other States (1965); See International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes, ICSID Convention, regulations and Rules, 
ICSID/15/Rev.1 (2003), 7-22, available at  http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ 
StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf. 
2 ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 570 (John H. 
Jackson ed., 2d ed. 2008). 
3 International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, List of 
Contracting States and Other Signatories of the Convention, as of May 5, 2011, 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&ac
tionVal=ShowDocument&language=English (noting that Russia, Brazil, 
Mexico, and Canada (signed by notified) are not contracting states).  
4 Id. at 1.   
5 Id.  
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increase of treaty based investment disputes between foreign investors 
and host states.
6  
The surge of these type of cases in the last fifteen years
7
 has 
been made possible by the availability of numerous new treaty 
instruments,
8
 and Bi-lateral Investment Treaties (BITs) created by 
states offering foreign investors access to international arbitration 
against the host state with jurisdiction in ICSID.  The growth of ICSID 
arbitration filings also coincided with the many crises suffered in many 
countries in the 1990s and early 2000s (e.g., Argentina’s, Russia’s, 
Ecuador’s, and Venezuela’s financial crises). The use of the investor-
state dispute resolution clauses in BITs by foreign investors to claim 
compensation before international arbitrators has given rise to a new 
type of international arbitration and has been seen as a revolution in 
international arbitration practice. 
China is among the countries that have signed the largest 
number of BITs.
9
  BITs are intended to encourage foreign investment 
in a host country by promising to protect the legal rights of the foreign 
investor.  The treaties therefore ordinarily contain both substantive and 
procedural protections to induce investors to make investments in 
foreign countries.   
China began to execute BITs in the early 1980s, when it was 
changing its economic policy to encourage foreign direct investment in 
China.  Chinese BITs of that era define the objectives of the 
                                                 
6 “The first investment treaty case, Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. 
(AAPL) v. Sri Lanka, was registered in 1987(23 non-investment treaty cases 
had been registered at ICSID prior to AAPL).” LUCY REED ET AL., GUIDE TO 
ICSID ARBITRATION 6-7 (2d ed. 2011).   
7 “As of June 30, 2011, ICSID had registered 351 cases under the ICSID 
Convention and Additional Facility Rules” out of which 313 cases filed since 
1997. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, ICSID 
Caseload-Statistics, Issue 2011-2, p. 7, available at www.icsid.worldbank.org 
/ICSID/Index.jsp. 
8 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development reported almost 
2,500 international investment agreements at the end of 2005. See UNCTAD 
The Entry into Force of Bilateral Investment treaties (BITs), IIA MONITOR 
No. 3 (2006), UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIA/2006/9, available at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webiteiia20069_en.pdf.  
9 There are currently 127 Chinese BITs, a complete list is available at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_pcbb/docs/bits_china.pdf, and copies of 
each BIT available at http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch____ 
779.aspx. 
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Contracting Parties broadly, for example, a “desir[e] to develop 
economic cooperation between the two Contracting Parties.”10 
Investment law on expropriation has been developing rapidly 
through decisions by international arbitral tribunals.  The terms of 
different treaties have been interpreted in resolving actual disputes 
between investors and host states.  Even though China has executed 
BITs since 1982, there has been no interpretation of the terms of a 
Chinese BIT in an investment arbitration case made against China by a 
foreign investor.   
China’s early BITs contained language relating to investment 
arbitration jurisdiction for matters related to expropriation which 
China’s negotiators and scholars considered limited arbitral jurisdiction 
to one subset of jurisdictional issues---the amount of compensation 
which should be paid to the investor if a local court determined there 
had been an unlawful expropriation by China.  China’s early model 
BIT language in the consent to arbitration clause (hereinafter “consent 
clause”) read: “[disputes] involving the amount of compensation for 
expropriation.”11 China believed, like many Communist countries, that 
no foreign arbitral tribunal should have authority to judge the public 
necessity of its determinations of the ownership of property within 
China. 
Therefore, it was ironic that the first investment treaty arbitration 
where Chinese BIT terms on jurisdiction were examined was on a 
claim by a Chinese investor in Peru who invoked the China-Peru BIT 
(1994)
12
 to claim damages for expropriation by Peru.
13
 Mr. Tza Yap 
                                                 
10 Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China 
and the Belgian-Luxembourg Economic Union on the Reciprocal Promotion 
and Protection of Investments done at Brussels on June 4, 1984, entered into 
force Oct. 5, 1986, 1938 U.N.T.S.305 (“Belgian/Luxembourg-China BIT”), 
preamble.   
11
 CHINESE MODEL BIT, reprinted in WENHUA SHAN & NORA 
GALLAGHER, CHINESE INVESTMENT TREATIES, POLICIES AND PRACTICE, app. 4 
(Loukas Mistelis series Editor, Oxford Int’l Arb. Series, 2009).  
12 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Peru and the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China Concerning the Encouragement 
and Reciprocal Protection of Investments done at Beijing on June 9, 1994, 
entered into force Feb. 1, 1995, 1901 U.N.T.S. 257 (“Peru-China BIT”), art. 
1(2)(a). 
13 Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, 
Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence (Feb. 12, 2007), summary available 
at http://www.italaw.com/documents/ TzaYapShumAwardIACLSummary.pdf. 
4 SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF [Vol. 8.1 
 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS 
 
Shum invested in a Peruvian fishmeal plant to make food products for 
export to Asia.
14
  Mr. Tza claimed that in 2004, the Peru tax authority 
investigated his business and levied liens on the firm’s bank accounts 
that “ended up destroying [Tza’s] business operations and economic 
viability.”15  This, he claimed, amounted to “indirect expropriation.”16 
Peru requested that the ICSID arbitral tribunal bifurcate the 
proceedings and decide first whether the tribunal had jurisdiction over 
Mr. Tza’s claim.17  This article examines the decision of the Tza 
tribunal on jurisdiction.
18
 In addition this article will focus on several 
important concepts that the arbitrators relied upon in determining, over 
Peru’s objection, that they were properly seized of jurisdiction taking 
into account the correct interpretation of multiple terms in the China-
Peru BIT (1994).  These include language relating to “nationality,” to 
the scope of the language of the consent clause, to the so-called “fork in 
the road” clause and to the “most favored nation” (MFN) clause.   
In particular, this article compares the ratio adopted in Tza to 
interpret the Chinese BIT language consent clause to five arbitral 
decisions by other investment arbitral tribunals on similar language and 
similar jurisdictional problems raised by the often ambiguous language 
used in BITs.
19
  These six decisions were written and filed 
contemporaneously with each other between 2006 and 2009, and yet 
they reach a multitude of different interpretations of virtually identical 
language contained in various BITs.   
What is particularly important for analyzing the likely 
interpretation of China’s BITs in future investment disputes is the 
treatment of MFN clauses by the six tribunals discussed in this article.  
That is because China has since entered into a new generation BITs.  
Whereas China had thought prior to Tza that the jurisdictional remit of 
its earlier BITs was restrictive, its later BITs executed since 2003 have 
openly broad language on jurisdiction.  If the previous generations 
BITs are read by future tribunals to contain MFN clauses allowing 
                                                 
14 Id. ¶ 30. 
15 Id. ¶ 31. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. ¶ 32. 
18 Id. The decision on the merits in Tza was issued July 5, 2011.  Mr. Tza 
was awarded over $700,000 in damages and $200,000 in interest.  
19 One is an English High Court decision, which reviews an ad hoc 
arbitral tribunal award and its interpretation of the similar BIT terms.  Czech 
Republic v. European Media Ventures, [2007] EWHC (Comm) 2851, [2007] 2 
C.L.C. 908 (Eng.).  
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broadened jurisdiction, then all prior China BITs would benefit from 
the broader jurisdictional language of its new BITs. 
 
I.  NATIONALITY OF THE FOREIGN INVESTOR IN TZA 
The first issue raised by Peru in defense of the Tza claim relates 
to Mr. Tza’s nationality.20  Peru argued that Mr. Tza’s residence in 
Hong Kong made his reliance on the China-Peru BIT improper.
21
  Peru 
said Mr. Tza must rely upon the separate Hong Kong-Peru BIT.
22
  This 
issue was a threshold issue for the arbitral tribunal in considering its 
jurisdiction over the claim because foreign nationality for an investor is 
crucial to ICSID jurisdiction.  The issue is also very important to China 
investment dispute analysis because it involves the relationship 
between the PRC and Hong Kong SAR BITs.   
ICSID jurisdiction requires three elements, namely a qualified 
foreign investor (personal jurisdiction or rationae personae), an 
investment dispute (subject-matter jurisdiction or rationae materiae) 
and consent.
23
 Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention provides as 
follows: 
The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any 
legal dispute arising directly out of an investment 
between a Contracting State (or any constituent 
subdivision or agency of a Contracting State 
designated to the Centre by that State) and a national 
of another Contracting State, which the parties to the 
dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre. 
                                                 
20 Id. ¶ 42.  
21 Id.  
22 Id. ¶ 48. 
23 See CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A 
COMMENTARY 71-341 (2d ed. 2009), David A. Williams, Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
871 (Christoph Schreuer ed., 2008); accord Devashishm Krishan, Nationality of 
Physical Persons, in INVESTMENT TREATY LAW: CURRENT ISSUES II, 57-66 
(British Inst. of Int’l and Comparative L. 2007); Roberto Aguirre Luzi & Ben 
Love, Individual Nationality in Investment Treaty Arbitration: The Tension 
between Customary International Law and Lex Specialis, in INVESTMENT 
TREATY LAW: CURRENT ISSUES III 183-208 (British Inst. of Int’l and 
Comparative L. 2009).  
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When the parties have given their consent, no party 
may withdraw its consent unilaterally.
24
  
Investors, individuals or corporations, allowed to bring an ICSID 
claim against the host state must meet a twofold nationality 
requirement: (i) a positive nationality requirement--the investor must 
have the nationality of a contracting state, and (ii) a negative nationality 
requirement--the investor must not be a national of the host state.
25
 The 
nationality requirement is derived from the principle that disputes 
between a local investor and its own state should naturally be resolved 
before local state courts. Therefore, jurisdiction in ICSID is confined to 
international investments disputes, i.e., investment disputes between a 
foreign investor and the host state.  
In Tza, the ICSID jurisdiction was based on the China-Peru BIT 
(1994).  The ICSID tribunal was asked to determine the positive 
nationality requirement, whether under Article 25(2) and the relevant 
provisions of the applicable BIT, (a) the Chinese investor had met his 
burden to prove his nationality under Chinese law, and (b) even if the 
burden was satisfied, his residence in Hong Kong prevented him from 
having recourse to the China-Peru BIT.
26
 
 
A.  NATIONALITY OF THE FOREIGN INVESTOR AS A NATURAL PERSON 
Article 25(2) of the ICSID Convention defines the foreign ‘natural 
person’ as follows: 
[A]ny natural person who had the nationality of a 
Contracting State other than the State party to the 
dispute on the date on which the parties consented to 
submit such dispute to conciliation or arbitration as 
well as on the date on which the request was 
registered pursuant to paragraph (3) of Article 28 or 
paragraph (3) of Article 36, but does not include any 
person who on either date also had the nationality of 
the Contracting State party to the dispute.
27
 
The dual requirement under Article 25(2), that the natural person 
be a national of the contracting state but not a national of the host state, 
                                                 
24 ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, supra note 1, at Art. 25(1). 
25 Id. at Art. 25(3). 
26 Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, 
Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence, ¶ 42 (Feb. 12, 2007).   
27 ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, supra note 1, at Art. 25(2).  
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excludes persons with a dual nationality in the State party to the 
dispute.
28
 This nationality requirement is also a continuous 
requirement, and must be met on the date the parties consented to 
arbitration and on the date the foreign national files his request for 
arbitration.  
Determination of nationality by ICSID tribunals is guided by two 
principles. First, the ICSID Convention itself does not set terms for the 
determination of the nationality of an individual. According to 
international law, the issue of nationality is usually dealt with by 
reference to the law of the State whose nationality is claimed.
29
  The 
law governing the dispute, under Article 42 of the ICSID Convention, 
does not apply to the nationality of the individual claimant.
30
   
Chinese BITs provide that a natural person qualifies as a Chinese 
investor when such person has the nationality of the PRC in accordance 
with its laws.
31
 Questions of nationality are to be determined by 
                                                 
28 David A. Williams, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 884-85 (Christoph Schreuer 
ed., 2008).  
29 Tza, ¶ 54 (“There is no question that according to international law it is 
for each State to determine who their nationals are under its law.”).    
30 ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, supra note 1, at Art. 42.   
31 Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments 
done at London on May 15, 1986, entered into force on May 15, 1986, 1462 
U.N.T.S. 255 (“UK-China BIT”), Art. 1(c)(ii); Peru-China BIT, supra note 12, 
at art. 1(2)(a); Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments Between the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and 
the Government of the People’s Republic of China done at Beijing on 
November 26, 2011, 2369 U.N.T.S. 219 (“Netherlands-PRC BIT”), Art. 
1(2)(a): “The term ‘investor’ means, (a) natural person who have the nationality 
of either Contracting Party in accordance with the laws of that Contracting 
Party.”  The recent FTAs signed respectively between China and ASEAN 
(Article 1(1)(i)) and New-Zealand (Article 135) provide for a unified definition 
and extend the protection to “permanent residents:” “‘natural person of a Party’ 
means any natural person possessing the nationality or citizenship of, or right 
of permanent residence in the Party in accordance with its laws and 
regulations.”  It is however to be noted that China does not have any domestic 
law for the treatment of permanent residents of foreign countries. Treaties 
available at http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch____779.aspx. 
8 SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF [Vol. 8.1 
 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS 
 
reference to the municipal law, subject to the applicable rules of 
international law.
32
  
Second, since the nationality of the individual claimant is a 
jurisdictional requirement, tribunals also apply the conditions set forth 
under the relevant municipal law in the frame of article 41 of the ICSID 
Convention. Article 41 grants tribunals the power to be the judge of 
their own competence.
33
 Therefore, a tribunal is empowered to finally 
decide for itself and make its own ruling on the nationality of the 
claimant, giving weight to the facts and municipal law before it. 
Under the China-Peru BIT (1994), Chinese law was the applicable 
law for the determination of Tza’s nationality.34 Under the Nationality 
Law of the PRC,
35
 Chinese nationality is acquired by birth, and 
conferred upon any person born in China whose parents are both 
Chinese nationals or one of whose parents is a Chinese national (Article 
4). The Nationality Law of the PRC also provides that China does not 
recognize dual nationality for any Chinese national (Article 3). Since 
1997, the Nationality Law directly applies to the Hong Kong SAR by 
way of promulgation and applies in the same way as it is applied in 
China.
36
 In Tza, the claimant was born in 1948, in the Chinese province 
of Fujian, but he had been a Hong Kong resident since 1972.  He held a 
Hong Kong SAR Passport stating he was born in China. Peru did not 
contest claimant was born in China from Chinese parents, nor did it 
allege that he had illegally acquired his nationality or had since 
acquired another nationality.  Rather the respondent challenged the 
credibility of the evidence provided by the claimant
37
 on the ground 
                                                 
32 Schreuer, supra note 23, ¶ 641. 
33 ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, supra note 1, at Art. 41. 
34 Peru-China BIT, supra note 12, at art. 1(2)(a).   
35 The Nationality Law (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo guoji fa) was 
adopted at the Third Session of the Fifth Chinese People’s National Assembly 
(NPA) and effective as of September 10, 1980.  
36 PRICILLA LEUNG MEI-FUN, THE HONG KONG BASIC LAW, HYBRID OF 
COMMON LAW AND CHINESE LAW 93 (LexixNexis 2007).  Pursuant to Article 
18 and Annex III of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong SAR, the Nationality 
Law applied in the Hong Kong SAR from 1 July 1997. It was implemented 
through the “Explanations of Some Questions Concerning the Implementation 
of the Nationality Law of the PRC in the Hong Kong SAR” adopted by the 
Standing Committee of the NPA on May 15, 1996, a year prior to the Hong 
Kong handover that came into effect on July 1, 1997. 
37 Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, 
Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence, ¶ 55-56 (Feb. 12, 2007). Namely a 
copy of the HKSR passport showing his birth place was in Fujian, China, and a 
copy of the Hong Kong ID Card, an affidavit stating his was born in China.    
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that it was merely prima facie evidence of the claimant’s nationality 
and that definitive proof of Chinese nationality required the production 
of the birth certificate, failing which Chinese nationality was not 
established. Mr. Tza was not able to provide his birth certificate since 
the relevant registry had been destroyed in 1949. 
The examination of the evidence by the tribunal followed the 
consensus that an official document issued by the relevant competent 
national authority on the nationality of the party should be regarded as 
prima facie evidence of nationality only,
38
 and that the issue was for the 
decision of the tribunal on all the evidence:  
Therefore, according to the Nationality Act as 
interpreted by the Permanent Committee of the 
People’s National Assembly for its application to 
Hong Kong, it seems to be clear, prima facie, that 
Claimant validly holds the Chinese nationality…. In 
the opinion of the Tribunal, the nationality conferred 
by a state to a person under its law has a strong 
presumption of validity.
39
 
The Tza tribunal referred to and adopted the solution found in Micula v. 
Romania.
40
  It balanced the burden of proof and determined that 
claimant’s evidence created a presumption that could be questioned, 
but the burden of proof then shifted to the respondent to invalidate such 
presumption and prove that the nationality was acquired in a manner 
that is inconsistent with international law.   
This solution is also found in customary law embodied in the 
International Law Commission Draft Articles of Diplomatic Protection 
which provides under Article 4 that for the purpose of the diplomatic 
protection, “State of nationality means a State whose nationality that 
person has acquired, in accordance with the law of that state, by birth, 
descent, naturalization, succession of States or in any other manner, not 
inconsistent with international law.”41 
                                                 
38 ZACHARY DOUGLAS, THE INVESTMENT LAW OF INVESTMENT CLAIMS ¶ 
537 (Cambridge Press Univ. 2009).     
39 Tza, ¶ 62-63. 
40 Id.  
41 Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, UN Doc. A/61/10, Art. 4, 61st 
Sess. Supp No. 10 (2006), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts 
/instruments/english/draft%20articles/9_8_2006.pdf. 
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Pursuant to the Sino-British Joint Declaration of December 19, 
1984 (the Joint Declaration), the PRC resumed sovereignty over Hong 
Kong July 1, 1997.  Peru claimed that even if the claimant’s nationality 
were Chinese, under the law of the PRC, Hong Kong residents may not 
have recourse to the Sino-Peru BIT.  This raised the question of the 
scope of application of the Sino-Peru BIT: whether it excluded Hong 
Kong residents.  The respondent claimed HKSAR residents were 
excluded from the scope of application of this BIT because of the set of 
laws governing the relationship between the Mainland and the HKSAR, 
such as the Joint Statement and the Basic Law which listed the 
international conventions that were applicable to Hong Kong, among 
which the BIT at stake was not listed, and the numbers of BITs signed 
by Hong Kong with others States, among which was a Peru-Hong 
Kong BIT.  
The tribunal took the view that the standard of its duty was in the 
terms of the ICSID Convention, and its duty under Article 25 of the 
ICSID Convention was limited to verifying whether claimant had the 
nationality of a “Contracting State.” The tribunal found that the 
claimant met his burden, proving that all Chinese nationals, including 
those residing in Hong Kong, were included in the scope of Article 
25.
42
 The tribunal did not entertain an examination of the relevant sets 
of laws and BITs.   
Instead, it primarily relied on the general rules of interpretation of 
treaties.  Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT) provides that “a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith and in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty in its context and in the light of its object and purpose.”43  The 
Tza tribunal noted that the BIT provision in respect of the Chinese 
investor nationality requirement merely provided “natural persons who 
have nationality of the PRC in accordance with its laws” and the 
intention of the Contracting Parties had to be considered as expressly 
provided for in the terms of the BIT, in accordance with Article 31.
44
 
Therefore the tribunal held Peru had not proven convincingly that the 
                                                 
42 Tza, ¶ 70. 
43 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Jan, 27, 1980, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331, Art. 31(1), available at http://www.oas.org/dil/Vienna 
_Convention_on_the_Law_of_Treaties.pdf. 
44 Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, 
Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence, ¶ 72 (Feb. 12, 2007), citing Peru-
China BIT, supra note 12, at art. 1(2)(a).  
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Contracting Parties, Peru and China, had the intention to exclude Hong 
Kong residents from the scope of this BIT.
45
 
Finally, the Tza tribunal found that it is not superfluous for Hong 
Kong to conclude its own investment treaties with countries that China 
also has entered into BITs.  Hong Kong has historically been home to 
people with multiple nationalities. For that reason the government “has 
deployed a policy that seeks the promotion and protection of 
investments in other countries for the benefit of all of its residents, 
regardless of their nationalities.”46 Indeed Hong Kong BITs concluded 
before 1997 and even thereafter provide for protection covering persons 
who have a right to abode regardless of their nationality.
47
 
 
B.  NATIONALITY OF THE FOREIGN INVESTOR AS A CORPORATION 
The second category of investors, juridical persons, are defined 
under Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID. The ICSID distinguishes between 
two types of foreign juridical persons: either the corporation has a 
nationality different from the one of the host state, or the corporation 
has the nationality of the host state but is under foreign control. 
Different from natural persons, the nationality requirement for juridical 
persons is not continuous and must be met only at the time the parties 
agreed to arbitrate. The ICSID convention does not define the term 
juridical person, but it is understood the entity must have legal 
personality.
48
 Nor does the ICSID Convention define the juridical 
person’s nationality. It is left to BITs to define it. In order to determine 
the nationality of the corporation, traditional private international law 
uses the test of the place of incorporation (or registered office) or the 
effective seat (siege social) and the control test. Chinese BITs shows 
use of these tests and have often combined them.
49
 The place of 
incorporation is often used.
50
 The place of incorporation and the seat 
                                                 
45 Id. ¶ 74. 
46 Id. ¶ 76. 
47 Id.   
48 SCHREUER, supra note 23, ¶ 693; See also Williams, supra note 28, at 
890. 
49 Shan & Gallagher, supra note 11, ¶¶ 2.52-71. 
50 UK-China BIT, supra note 31, at art. 1(d)(ii) (“in respect of the 
People’s Republic of China: corporations, firms or associations incorporated or 
constituted under the law in force in any part of the People’s Republic of 
China.”). 
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criteria are combined to narrow the scope of application.
51
 The control 
test does not seem to have been used as the sole test but only as an 
alternative to the other tests.
52
   
The Tza decision left unresolved the status of companies 
incorporated in Hong Kong.  That issue did not arise because a Chinese 
natural person made the Peruvian investment.  
Pursuant to the resumption of sovereignty and the Basic Law, 
coming into force on July 1, 1997, the Hong Kong SAR has been 
granted legislative powers under Article 2 of the Basic Law and has 
conserved its pre-1997 common law system.
53
 In particular, Hong 
Kong companies are subject to a body of statutes based on common 
law (the Companies Ordinance Chapter 32), while Mainland companies 
are subject to the Company Law of the PRC as revised in 2005. Article 
18(3) of the Basic Law provides for the application of “national laws” 
in the Hong Kong SAR limited to a list of laws specifically identified 
(See Annex III of the Basic Law which expressly includes the above 
mentioned Nationality Law).
54
  
Also, in compliance with Article 151 of the Basic Law,
55
 HK has 
                                                 
51 Peru-China BIT, supra note 12, at art. 1(2)(b) (“in respect of the 
People’s Republic of China: economic entities established in accordance with 
the laws of the People’s Republic of China and domiciled in the territory of the 
People’s Republic of China.”). 
52 China-Peru Free Trade Agreement, China-Peru, done at Beijing on 
Apr. 28, 2009 (“China-Peru FTA”), ch. 10, art. 126 (definition of Investors: 
“(a)(ii) economic entities established in accordance with the laws of the 
People’s Republic of China and domiciled in the territory of the People’s 
Republic of China; or (iii) legal entities not established under the law of the 
People’s Republic of China but effectively controlled, by natural persons, as 
defined in subparagraph (a)(i) [Chinese nationals] or by economic entities as 
defined in subparagraph (a)(ii), that have made an investment in the territory of 
the other Party.”), available at http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english/index.shtml. 
53 The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of 
the People’s Republic of China [Constitution] Dec. 19, 1984, ch. I, art. 2 (“The 
National People's Congress authorizes the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region to exercise a high degree of autonomy and enjoy executive, legislative 
and independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication, in 
accordance with the provisions of this Law.), ch. II, art. 17 (“The Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region shall be vested with legislative power.”), 
available at http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/index.html. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at ch. VII, art. 151 (“The Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region may on its own, using the name “Hong Kong, China,” maintain and 
develop relations and conclude and implement agreements with foreign states 
2011] THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTOR STATE DISPUTES  13 
 AND CHINA: NEW DEVELOPMENTS ON ICSID 
 JURISDICTION 
 
continued to enter into international agreements, including BITs.
56
 In 
these BITs, Hong Kong investors as legal persons are defined as: 
“corporations, partnerships and associations incorporated or constituted 
under the law in force in its area” (Article 4(b) of the Thailand-Hong 
Hong 2005 BIT, Article 1(f)(ii) of the UK-Hong Kong 1998 BIT).
57
 In 
addition, in the Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership 
Arrangement (CEPA) dated June 29, 1999, the juridical person as 
service supplier under CEPA is defined in relation to the applicable 
laws of the area of each party to CEPA, as follows: 
“juridical person” means any legal entity duly 
constituted or otherwise organized under the 
applicable laws of the Mainland or the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region, whether for profit or 
otherwise, and whether privately-owned or 
governmentally-owned, including any corporation, 
trust, partnership, joint venture, sole proprietorship or 
association (business association) (Emphasis 
added).
58
  
Thus, unlike for natural persons where the Nationality Law has 
expressly been extended to Hong Kong under Annex III of the Basic 
                                                                                                 
and regions and relevant international organizations in the appropriate fields, 
including the economic, trade, financial and monetary, shipping, 
communications, tourism, cultural and sports fields.”); See also Sun Zhichao, 
International Legal Personality of the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region , 7 CHINESE J. OF INT’L L., no. 2, 2008, at 339, 339-352, available at 
http://chinesejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/7/2/339.full.pdf. 
56 Agreement between the Government of Hong Kong and the 
Government of Japan for the Promotion and Protection of Investment done at 
Tokyo May 15, 1997, entered into force June 18, 1997, (“Hong Kong-Japan 
BIT”); Agreement between the Government of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China and the Government 
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the Promotion 
and Protection of Investments done at Hong Kong July 30, 1998, entered into 
force Apr. 12, 1999, (“Hong Kong-UK BIT”); Agreement between the 
Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Government of the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments done at Busan Nov. 19, 2005, entered 
into force Apr. 18, 2006, (“Thailand-Hong Kong BIT”), all BITs available at 
http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch____779.aspx. 
57 Id. 
58 The Mainland/Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement 
(CEPA) (China 2003) (Article 2.3 to Annex 5 to the CEPA). 
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law, the definition of Chinese companies in Chinese BITs by the 
double requirement, “economic entities established in accordance with 
the laws of the PRC and domiciled in the territory of the PRC,” leaves 
the situation unresolved for companies incorporated in Hong Kong. 
The second requirement, i.e. establishment in the PRC, has been met 
since the resumption of sovereignty in 1997. However, the first 
requirement does not seem to be met if the term “the laws of the PRC” 
is construed, in the context of companies, to mean “national laws” or 
“law of the Mainland” as opposed to “laws of Hong Kong.” In such a 
case, companies incorporated under the laws of Hong Kong are not 
covered by Chinese BITs.
59
 
There remains the role of Hong Kong as a transhipping (and even a 
round shipping centre)
60
 in particular for Chinese public and private 
investors who use Hong Kong companies to invest abroad. If controlled 
by Chinese investors, the latter may have resort to the control test used 
in recent Chinese BITs, to claim protection under Chinese BITs, under 
the following definition: “legal entities not established under the law of 
the PRC but effectively controlled, by natural persons, as defined in 
subparagraph (a)(i) [Chinese nationals] or by economic entities as 
defined in subparagraph (a)(ii), that have made an investment in the 
territory of the other Party.”61 
 
II.  PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS UNDER CHINESE BITS 
BITs impose procedural steps before an aggrieved investor may 
trigger an international arbitration under the auspices of ICSID.  Two 
mandatory procedural steps were contained in the China-Peru BIT: (i) a 
waiting or cooling off period of six months for amicable settlement, 
and (ii) the exercise of a choice of either local court process or 
international arbitration.
62
 
 
 
                                                 
59 Contra Shan & Gallagher, supra note 11, ¶¶ 2.76-.80 (stating that 
Hong Kong corporate entities are, in principle, covered by Chinese BITs unless 
expressly excluded, as in the 2006 Russia-China BIT (which has not entered 
into force)).  
60 A “round shipping” center means an investment made by a Chinese 
citizen in a Hong Kong company for reinvestment in the PRC. 
61 China-Peru FTA, supra note 52, at ch. 10, art.126 “Investors” (a)(iii).  
62 Id. 
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A.  WAITING PERIOD 
In the Peru-China BIT (1994), consent to arbitration is subject to 
the condition that the dispute cannot be settled by negotiation.
63
  
Investors are required to attempt an amicable settlement to solve the 
dispute through negotiation or consultation prior to having recourse to 
arbitration.
64
  This requires the investor to observe a “waiting period” 
or “cooling off” period, which was set in the treaty at six months.65  
The starting date of the waiting period may not be provided
66
 or it 
might be triggered by the event giving rise to the dispute (state action, 
such as enactment of a statute) or from the “date when [the dispute] has 
been raised by one of the parties in dispute.”67  In others, the date is 
measured from a written notification of the dispute,
68
 or from a 
“request for consultations and negotiations”69 from “the date either 
party requested amicable settlement.”70  For example, in the 2008 
                                                 
63 Peru-China BIT, supra note 12, at art. 8(1) (“Any dispute between an 
investor of one Contracting Party and the other Contracting Party in connection 
with an investment in the territory of the other Contracting Party shall, as far as 
possible, be settled amicably through negotiations between the parties to the 
dispute.”). 
64 China-Peru FTA, supra note 52, at art. 139(1). 
65 Peru-China BIT, supra note 12, at art. 8(3). 
66 See Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Botswana 
and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Promotion and 
Protection of Investments done at Beijing June 12, 2000, (“China-Botswana 
BIT”), art. 9(2), available at http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch 
____779.aspx.  
67 Agreement between the People’s Republic of China and the Federal 
Republic of Germany on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments, Beijing, December 1, 2003, 2362 U.N.T.S. 253 (“China-German 
BIT”) Art, 9(1) (Entered into force November 11, 2005). 
68 See UK-China BIT, supra note 31, at art. 7(1). 
69 Free Trade Agreement in Between the Government of the Peoples 
Republic of China and the Government of New Zealand, (“China-New Zealand 
FTA”) art. 152 (Entered into force Oct. 1, 2008) available at 
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/ennewzealand.shtml.  
70 China-Netherlands BIT, supra note 31, at art. 10(3); see also 
Agreement between the Czech Republic and the People’s Republic of China on 
the Promotion and Protection of Investments done at Prague Dec. 8, 2005, 
(“Czech-China BIT”), art. 9(2) (“six months of the date when the request for 
the settlement has been submitted.”), available at 
http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch____779.aspx; Agreement on 
Investment of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-
operation between the People’s Republic of China and the Association of 
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China-Mexico BIT a formal notice requirement is found with a notice 
period of “at least 6 months.”71  Consent clauses do not merely provide 
for a waiting requirement but also require the parties to take active 
action in trying to settle amicably.  The wording of the clause “shall” or 
“should” may be binding.  
More recent BITs also require, in addition to the above, a notice 
period before arbitration proceedings,
72
 and in certain cases, the service 
of a notice of claim followed by observance of an additional 3 or 6 
month notice period prior to starting arbitration.
73
 Therefore, this raises 
the occurrence of a double notice period (notice for negotiation and 
notice of intent to arbitrate) and a double waiting period (negotiation 
period and arbitration notice period).  
Arbitral tribunals have examined waiting clauses by taking note of 
the compliance of the investor with this clause.  In some cases, 
tribunals have tested its legal effect when there is a claim of alleged 
non-compliance with the requirement.  Decisions are not unanimous on 
the issue, but most decisions hold that the failure to respect the 
negotiation time limit has no effect on the jurisdiction of the tribunal.  
These tribunals hold that the waiting period constitutes a mere 
procedural requirement
74
 that does not affect the standing of the claim 
as long as it can be shown that no prospect of amicable solution could 
be found.  In Goetz v Burundi, which involved the Burundi-Belgium 
BIT 1989, the pre-arbitration procedural requirement included (i) 
written notice of intent prior to arbitration, and (ii) 3 months 
negotiation at diplomatic level between contracting states seems to be 
more restrictive because of the level of negotiation.
75
 
                                                                                                 
Southeast Asian Nations, Bangkok, August 15, 2009 (“China – ASEAN FTA) 
art. 14(4) (Entered into force February 15, 2010). 
71 Agreement between the Government of the United Mexican States and 
the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Promotion and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investments done at Beijing July 11, 2008, entered 
into force June 6, 2009, (“Mexico-China BIT”), art. 12(2) & Appendix A, 
available at http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch____779.aspx. 
72 China-New Zealand FTA, supra note 69, at art. 153(2).  
73 See China-Peru FTA, supra note 52, at art. 139(4).  
74 Enron Corp. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 88 (Jan. 14, 2004) (discussing whether the waiting 
period is a procedural or jurisdictional requirement), available at 
http://www.asil.org/ilib/Enron.pdf.  
75 Goetz v. Burundi, ICSID Case No. ARB/95/3, Award, ( Feb. 10, 
1999), 15 ICSID Rev.-F.I.L.J. 454 (2000), available at http://italaw.com/ 
documents/Goetz-Award.pdf.  
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There are cases, however, where tribunals have given force to the 
interaction of a notice of claim requirement and negotiation 
requirement.  In Western NIS Enterprise Fund v Ukraine, the tribunal 
ordered the claimant to comply with the notice of intent prior to 
arbitration and suspended the proceedings from the date of 
notification.
76
 In Ethyl Corp. v Canada, the tribunal found that 
claimant’s failure to exhaust the waiting period did not affect its 
jurisdiction, yet it considered the proceedings premature.
77
  The 
tribunal did not suspend the arbitral process to demand compliance, but 
granted damages to the respondent for breach of the term. 
 
B.  EXHAUSTION OF LOCAL REMEDIES AND FORK IN THE ROAD CLAUSE. 
Exhaustion of local remedies is a concept traditionally used in 
investment arbitration as a condition precedent to access to 
international arbitration.  Whether exhaustion of local remedies is 
required when jurisdiction is based upon a BIT is a matter of wording 
of each treaty. Article 26 of the ICSID Convention provides:  
Consent of the parties to arbitration under this 
Convention shall, unless otherwise stated, be deemed 
consent to such arbitration to the exclusion of any 
other remedy.  A Contracting State may require the 
exhaustion of local administrative or judicial 
remedies as a condition of its consent to arbitration 
under this Convention.
78
  
The effect of this provision is to reverse the situation under 
customary international law in that the contracting states waive the 
traditional requirement of exhaustion of local remedies unless 
otherwise stated.
79
 If a state conditions its consent to arbitrate to 
exhaustion of local remedies in a BIT, then this requirement trumps the 
                                                 
76 W. NS Enter. Fund v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/2, Order, 
(March 16, 2006), available at http://italaw.com/documents/ARB042 _ORDER 
reNotice.pdf.   
77 Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, UNICTRAL (NAFTA), Award on Jurisdiction, 
¶ 88 (June 24, 1998), 38 ILM 708 (1999), available at 
http://italaw.com/documents/Ethyl-Award.pdf. 
78 ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, supra note 1, at Art. 26. 
79 See CHRISTOPHER DUGAN ET AL., INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 347 
(2008) (presentation of an exhaustion of local remedies under customary 
international law). 
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first sentence of Article 26.
80
 In investment arbitration, it is rare that 
consent would require exhaustion of local remedies as a condition 
precedent to access arbitration, as the very aim of investment 
agreements is to grant the foreign investor a direct right to international 
arbitration against the host state. Requirement of exhaustion would 
seem to contradict this very principle, but the ICSID Convention 
permits it. 
“Fork in the road clauses” are opposites to the requirement of 
exhaustion of local remedies. Under a fork in the road clause, the 
investor may lose access to international arbitration by selecting local 
remedies.  Typical BIT fork in the road clauses require the investor to 
choose a forum at the outset of the dispute resolution process: the 
claimant irrevocably elects a procedural remedy when it commences its 
legal proceedings in either the courts of the host state or international 
arbitration.
81
  The wording of the relevant BIT clauses may differ and 
each must be examined carefully. For example, the China-Argentina 
BIT provides: “Where an investor has submitted a dispute either to the 
aforementioned competent tribunal of the Contracting Party where the 
investment has been made or to international arbitration, this choice 
shall be final.”82  
Sometimes the wording of the clause does not make the intention 
explicit and construction by the tribunal is required. For instance, in 
Tza, the China-Peru BIT (1994) contained wording that was described 
by the tribunal as a fork in the road clause: 
2. If the dispute cannot be settled through 
negotiations within six months, either party to the 
dispute shall be entitled to submit this dispute to the 
                                                 
80 SCHREUER, supra note 23, at 388, 390-91.  
81 Christoph Schreuer, Consent to Arbitration, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 830, 848 (Peter Muchlinski et 
al eds., 2008), see also Christoph Schreuer, Travelling the BIT Route of Waiting 
Periods, Umbrella Clauses and Forks in the Road, 5 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE, 
no. 2, Apr. 2004, at 231. 
82 Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China 
and the Government of the Argentine Republic on the Promotion and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investments done at Beijing on Nov. 5, 1992, entered 
into force June. 17, 1994, 1862 U.N.T.S. 3 (“China-Argentina BIT”), art. 8(3). 
See also; Agreement between Japan and the People’s Republic of China 
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment done 
at Beijing on Aug. 27, 1988, entered into force May 14, 1989, 1555 U.N.T.S. 
197 (“Japan-China BIT”), all BITS available at http://www.unctadxi.org/ 
templates/docsearch____779.aspx. 
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competent court of the Contracting Party 
accepting the investment.  
3. If a dispute involving the amount of compensation 
for expropriation cannot be settled within six months 
after resort to negotiations as specified in Para. 1 of 
this Art., it may be submitted at the request of either 
party to the international arbitration of ICSID. Any 
disputes concerning other matters between an 
investor of either Contracting Party and the other 
Contracting Party may be submitted to the Centre if 
the parties to the disputes so agree. The provisions 
of this Para. shall not apply if the investor 
concerned has resorted to the procedure specified 
in Para. 2 of this Art. (emphasis added).
83
 
In Tza, the fork in the road issue arose in the context of construing 
the meaning of the arbitration consent clause under Article 8(3).  The 
tribunal found the fork in the road clause acted to prevent the claimant 
from ever exercising the choice for arbitration.  It found that under this 
BIT, (i) if state courts have exclusive jurisdiction for the liability stage 
of the dispute as affirmed in Article 8(2), and (ii) if recourse to state 
courts bars access to international arbitration as affirmed in Article 
8(3), then there existed no possibility to arbitrate the dispute at all.
84
  
As held by the Tza tribunal, the arbitrator finds himself with an 
“irrevocable either or choice, also known as folk in the road, may not 
under any circumstance make use of ICSID arbitration to settle the 
dispute involving the amount of compensation for expropriation.”85  
 
III.  CONSENT CLAUSE TO ARBITRATION 
Consent to ISCID jurisdiction is a two-step process. First, the 
home state of the investor and the host state must be party to the ISCID 
Convention (Contracting States).
86
 Failure to ratify the ICSID 
Convention by the state of either party prevents ICSID jurisdiction.  
Hence, non-Contracting States must use alternative arbitration rules, 
                                                 
83 Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, 
Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence, ¶ 159 (Feb. 12, 2007).    
84 Id. 
85 Id.  
86 Williams, supra note 28, at 872 (stating that it is often seen as the 
Contract State’s personal jurisdiction requirement).  
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such as ICSID additional facilities, the International Chamber of 
Commerce rules, the Hong Kong International Arbitration Center rules 
or ad-hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL arbitration rules.  Before 
China’s ratification of the ICSID Convention, Chinese BITs provided 
for ad-hoc arbitration under UNCITRAL rules.  Some Chinese BITs 
also anticipated China’s ratification and consented to ICSID 
jurisdiction, conditional upon China ratifying the Washington 
Convention,
87
 or by requiring the signature of a protocol after 
ratification.
88
 After ratification of the Convention, most Chinese BITs 
immediately offered ICSID as the sole forum or as an option.
89
  Only a 
few Chinese BITs continued to use ad-hoc arbitration.
90
 
                                                 
87 Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China 
and Spain on the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments 
done at Madrid on Feb. 9, 1992, entered into force May 1, 1993, 1746 U.N.T.S. 
167, (“China-Spain BIT”), art. 9(2) (allowing the investor to choose ICSID 
arbitration, if both states become party to the ICSID convention, for disputes 
concerning an amount of compensation referred to in Article 4 [expropriation]); 
See also Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and 
the Government of the People’s Republic of China Concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments done at Peking on 
Nov. 8, 1993, entered into force June 1. 1994, 2366 U.N.T.S. 42647 
(“Lithuania-China BIT”), art. 8(2)(c); Agreement between the Government of 
the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the State of Bahrain 
concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment done 
at Beijing on June 17, 1999, entered into force Jan. 4, 2000, (“China-Bahrain 
BIT”), art. 9(3)(b), all BITS available at 
http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch____779.aspx. 
88 Agreement on the Mutual Protection of Investments between the 
Government of the Kingdom of Sweden and the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China done at Beijing on Mar. 29, 1982, entered into force Mar. 
29, 1982, 1350 U.N.T.S. 247 (“Sweden-China BIT”), Protocol, available at 
http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch____779.aspx.  
89 China-Peru BIT, supra note 12, at art. 8(3). Contra Kim M. Rooney, 
ICSID and BIT Arbitrations and China, 24 J. OF INT’L ARB., no. 6, 2007, at 704 
(stating that after China’s accession to the Washington Convention became 
effective it took some years for references to ICSID arbitration as an alternative 
dispute resolution method to be generally included in the first generation of 
China BITs).  
90 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and 
the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Promotion and 
Protection of Investments done at Jakarta on Nov. 18, 1994, entered into force 
Apr. 1, 1995, 1901 U.N.T.S. 291 (“Indonesia-China BIT”), art. 9(3) (“If a 
dispute involving the amount of compensation resulting from expropriation 
cannot be settled as specified in paragraph 1 of this Article within six months, it 
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Second, there must be a specific consent in writing to arbitration 
between the investor from a Contracting State, the foreign investor, and 
the host state.
91
  This specific consent in writing may be found in direct 
agreements entered into between the foreign investor and the host state. 
In BITs, specific consent in writing is derived from the meeting of a 
binding offer to arbitrate made in the BIT by the host state to qualifying 
investors, on the one hand, and an acceptance of the offer by a 
qualifying investor resulting from the submission of a claim against the 
host state before the arbitration center.
92
 The scope of the consent to 
arbitration contained in the host state’s binding offer directly affects the 
tribunal’s subject matter and personal jurisdiction. It is particularly true 
with respect to Chinese BITs, with the consent clauses worded to 
reflect each of the stages of China’s international economic and 
investment policy. 
 
A.  SCOPE OF CONSENT IN CHINESE BITS 
In order to determine the scope of the consent to arbitration, each 
treaty has its own wording and no general rule can be drawn.  Some 
treaty consent clauses are very general and include broad wording, such 
as “any legal dispute … concerning an investment.”  Other clauses are 
worded in more limited terms.
93
 China BITs consent clauses provide a 
good illustration of differences.
94
  
China’s first BIT with Sweden in 1982 did not contain any direct 
investor-State dispute arbitration clause.
 95
  Subsequent Chinese BITs 
                                                                                                 
may be submitted to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal.”), available at 
http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch____779.aspx. 
91 ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, supra note 1, at Art. 25. 
92 See Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID REV. – 
FOREIGN INV. L. J., no. 2, Fall 1995, at 232, available at http://www.arbitration-
icca.org/media/0/12254614477540/jasp_article_-
_arbitration_without_privity.pdf; DUGAN ET AL., supra note 78, at 219; 
Schreuer, Consent to Arbitration, supra note 79, at 832.  
93 See presentation of all types of limitations on consent in treaties, in 
SCHREUER, supra note 23, ¶ 526-540. 
94 See Kong Qingjiang, “Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Chinese 
Approach and Practice,” in ASIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Volume 
8, 2003 Brill, p. 105 ¶ 4.8. 
95 Sweden – China BIT, supra note 88. See also Agreement between the 
Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Government of the People's 
Republic of China Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments, Bangkok, March 12, 1985 1443 U.N.T.S. 31 (“China-Thailand 
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limited consent clauses to the amount of compensation resulting from 
one or some of the rights granted under the BIT.  For example, China 
BITs used these various phrasing: “the dispute concerning the amount 
of compensation referred to in para. 3 of Article 5 [protection of 
investments and returns];” 96 “dispute involving the amount of 
compensation resulting from expropriation, nationalization, or other 
measures having effect equivalent to nationalization or 
expropriation;”97 “if the disputes concerns the amount of compensation 
referred to in Art. 4 [expropriation];”98 “dispute . . . concerning an 
amount of compensation.”99   
In Tza, the China-Peru BIT provided under Article 8(3): “If a 
dispute involving the amount of compensation for expropriation cannot 
be settled within six months after resort to negotiations as specified in 
Para. 1 of this Art., it may be submitted at the request of either party to 
the international arbitration of ICSID.”100 This type of consent clause is 
                                                                                                 
BIT”) (no investor-State dispute resolution clause); Agreement between the 
Government Australia and the Government of the People's Republic of China 
on the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments, Beijing, July 
11, 1988, 1514 U.N.T.S. 65 (“China-Australia BIT”) (providing only for local 
judicial or administrative remedy, and arbitration in a third country to be agreed 
upon subsequently). 
96 Japan-China BIT, supra note 82, at Art. 11. 
97 Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China 
and the Government of the Republic of Singapore on the Promotion and 
Protection of Investments, Beijing, November 21, 1985, 1443 U.N.T.S. 279 
(“China-Singapore BIT”) Art. 13 (February 7, 1986) 
98 Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China 
and the Government of the Hellenic Republic for the Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Beijing, June 25, 1992 (“China-Greece 
BIT”) Art. 10(2); Accord Agreement between the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Ghana Concerning 
the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Beijing, October 
12, 1989 (“China-Ghana BIT”) Art. 10(1) (providing for ad-hoc arbitration for 
disputes “concerning the amount of compensation for expropriation”); China 
and Denmark Agreement concerning the encouragement and reciprocal 
protection of investments, Beijing, April 29, 1985 (“China-Denmark BIT 
1985”) Art. 8(3) (“dispute involving the amount of compensation resulting from 
expropriation mentioned in article 4”). 
99 UK-China BIT, supra note 31, at Art. 7(1). 
100 Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, 
Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence, ¶ 144 (Feb. 12, 2007), see also 
Spain and China Agreement on reciprocal encouragement and protection of 
investments, Madrid, February 6, 1992, 1746 U.N.T.S. 167 (“China-Spain 
BIT”) Art. 9(2) (“concerning an amount of compensation referred to in Article 
4 [expropriation]”); Monika C E. Heymann, International Law and the 
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similar to those in BITs signed by the former Soviet Union, the Czech 
Republic and Hungary, and they will be examined in detail infra 
Section C. 
The traditional interpretation of these clauses limited the 
arbitrator’s jurisdiction to determine the amount of compensation for 
expropriation.  The fact of expropriation would have to be decided by 
the local courts.  One author has said this “tradition” had been broken 
by two BITs entered into with Germany and the Netherlands.
101
 
However, the change was more subtle than that. The beginning of 
change in China BITs was with the insertion of comprehensive dispute 
settlement clauses, providing for either ad-hoc or ICSID arbitration, in 
the late 1990’s102 with the 1998 China-Barbados BIT103 and was 
followed by the 2000 China-Botswana BIT,
104
 the 2000 China-Iran 
BIT,
105
 and the 2001 Jordan-China BIT.
106
  Thereafter, they were 
                                                                                                 
Settlement of Investment Disputes relating to China, 11 J. Int’l Econ. L., 507-
526 (2008) (China-Lithuania BIT, China-Bahrain 1999 BIT quoted in fn 60 and 
61, respectively). 
101 Peter J. Turner, Investor-State Arbitration, MANAGING BUSINESS 
DISPUTES IN TODAY’S CHINA – DUELLING WITH DRAGONS 234 (Michael J. 
Moser ed., 2007).  
102 See Wang Guiguo, China’s Practice in International Investment Law: 
From Participation to Leadership in the World Economy, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 
575, 584-85 (2009), see also Stephan W. Schill, Tearing down the Great Wall: 
the New Generation Investment Treaties of the People’s Republic of China, 15 
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 73, 89-93 (2007). 
103 Agreement Between the Government of Barbados and The 
Government of the People’s Republic of China for the Promotion and 
Protection of Investments, Bridgetown, July 20, 1998 (“China – Barbados 
BIT”), but see Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China and the Government of the State of Bahrain Concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Beijing, June 17, 
1999 (“China – Bahrain BIT”) art. 9 (The dispute clause limited ad-hoc tribunal 
or ICSID arbitration to disputes regarding the amount of the compensation for 
expropriation or nationalization). 
104 Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Botswana 
and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Promotion and 
Protection of Investments, Beijing, June 12, 2000 (“China – Botswana BIT”) 
art. 9(3) (not yet entered into force) (Providing for dispute settlement via ICSID 
or ad-hoc arbitral tribunal, the latter of which allows the contracting party 
involved to require exhaustion of domestic remedies). 
105 Agreement on Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investment 
between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Beijing, June 22, 2000 (“Iran – China BIT”) art. 12 (provides 
for ad-hoc arbitration for “any dispute … with respect to an investment.”). 
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followed by the renegotiated China-German and China-Netherlands 
BITs in 2001 and 2003, respectively.  China has now entered into 90 
BITs and more than 30 contain a comprehensive dispute resolution 
clause.  
The scope of the arbitration clauses in the newer Chinese BITs is 
broad.  For example, new Chinese BIT dispute resolution clauses 
provide for “any dispute … in connection with an investment,”107 or  
“concerning an investment,”108 or “with respect to an investment,”109 or 
“related to an investment.”110 It also includes in other BITs “any 
investment dispute”111 or “any legal dispute.”112 The new model 
Chinese BIT, Version III, provides for “any legal dispute … in 
                                                                                                 
106 Agreement Between the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the 
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Amman, November 5, 
2001 (“Jordan – China BIT”) art. 10 (not yet entered into force) (provides 
for the option of ICSID or ad-hoc arbitration at the investor’s request “for any 
legal dispute”); see generally Shan & Gallagher, supra note 11, at 42, (list as of 
July 2008 of Chinese BITs and FTAs with open access to international 
arbitration). 
107 China – Bahrain BIT, supra note 103, at art. 9(1); China – Botswana 
BIT, supra note 104, at art. 9(1); Agreement Between the Czech Republic and 
the People’s Republic of China on the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments, Prague, December 8, 2005 (“Czech Republic – China BIT) Art. 
9(1). 
108 Agreement on encouragement and reciprocal protection of 
investments between the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and 
the Government of the People's Republic of China (with protocol). Beijing, 
November 26, 2001, 2369 U.N.T.S. 219 (“China – Netherlands BIT) Art.10(1) 
(Entered into force August 1, 2004); see also China-German BIT, supra note 
67, at Art, 9(1). 
109 Agreement on Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investment 
between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Beijing, June 22, 2000 (“Iran – China BIT”) Art. 12(1). 
110 Agreement Between the Government of the Russian Federation and 
the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Promotion and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Beijing, November 9, 2006 (“China-
Russia BIT”) Art. 9(1). 
111 China – Barbados BIT, supra note 103, art.10; see also Axel Berger, 
Ger. Dev. Inst., China’s New Bilateral Investment Treaty Programme: 
Substance, rational and implications for international investment law making, 
11, n. 50 (2008) (Prepared for ASIL IELIG 2008 Biennial Conference “The 
Politics of International Economic Law: The Next Four Years”) available at 
http://www.asil.org/files/ielconferencepapers/berger.pdf.  
112 Jordan – China BIT, supra note 106, at art. 10 (not yet entered into 
force). 
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connection with an investment.”113 Even the China-Pakistan FTA 
Chapter IX Investment Agreement from 2006 provides for a scope of 
consent similar to the wording of Chinese BITs: “Any legal dispute … 
in connection with an investment.”114 
The wording in the newer China BITs is similar to the European 
BITs’ consent clauses which provide for jurisdiction over “any dispute 
concerning an investment.” 115 This broad clause would include not 
only an investor’s claim for violation of the BIT’s substantive 
standards, but also a claim made in connection with a contract arising 
out of an investment.
116
 In particular, this language in a consent clause 
has been construed to allow an arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction over an 
investor’s claims against the host state based on breach of a contract.117 
One author has questioned the possibility of applying this broad 
wording to investment contracts on the grounds that such contracts are 
not entered into with the state at all.
118
 However, it should be noted that 
for investors in China the prevalence foreign investors who form 
Chinese Joint Ventures with Chinese SOEs.  Chinese SOEs are owned 
by local or central government, and may in principle be subject to veil 
piercing procedures.  
                                                 
113 CHINESE MODEL BIT VERSION III (Current) Art. 9(1), reprinted in 
Shan & Gallagher, supra note 11, app. 4, at 436. 
114 Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 
Islamabad, November 24, 2006 (“China-Pakistan FTA”) Art. 54. 
115 UNITED KINGDOM MODEL BIT (2005), Art. 8, reprinted in Zachary 
Douglas, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF INVESTMENT CLAIMS, app. 10, at 564 
(2009). 
116 See SCHREUER, supra note 23, at 71-341; Schreuer, Consent to 
Arbitration, supra note 81, at 830, 837-39; see also Shan & Gallagher, supra 
note 11, ¶ 8.66, 327-28. 
117 See Salini Costruttori S.P.A. and Italstrade S.P.A. v. Kingdom of 
Morocco, ICSID Case no. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 43-49 (July 
23, 2001), 6 ICSICD Rep. 400 (2004); SGS Société Générale de Surveillance 
S.A. v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision on 
Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 128 (January 29, 2004) 8 ICSID Rep. 518 (2005); 
Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. & Vivendi Universal v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment, (July 3, 2002), 
6 ICSID Rep. 340 (2004). See generally Schreuer, Consent to Arbitration, 
supra note 81, at 830 837-39.  
118 Shan & Gallagher, supra note 11, ¶ 8.68, 328-29. 
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More recent Chinese BITs
119
 provide for a scope of consent limited 
to treaty breaches: “disputes . . . arising from an alleged breach of an 
obligation set forth in Chapter II entailing loss or damage”120 or “[a]ny 
legal dispute arising under this Chapter … directly concerning an 
investment.”121 The arbitral jurisdiction in the ASEAN-China 
Agreement on Investment of the Framework Agreement on 
Comprehensive Economic Co-operation (ASEAN-China Investment 
Agreement) is also expressly limited to claims for the breach of one of 
the treaty standards.
122
 This newest formulation is in line the US 
practice of BITs limiting arbitral jurisdiction to claims arising from 
                                                 
119 As of April 2011 China has signed five FTAs: with Chile in 2005 (no 
Chapter on Investments), with Pakistan in 2006 (Investment Chapter 9), with 
New Zealand in 2008 (Investment Chapter 11), with Singapore in 2008 (no 
Chapter on Investments but refers to the ASEAN-China Investment Agreement 
which is incorporated into and forms an integral part of the China-Singapore 
FTA), with Costa Rica in 2010 (Investment Chapter 11), see FTAs texts 
available at http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english/index.shtml 
120 Agreement Between the Government of the United Mexican States 
and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Promotion and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Beijing, July 11, 2008 (“China-Mexico 
BIT”) Art. 11 (Chapter II “Protection to Investment” contains provides for six 
substantial protections, national treatment (Article 3), most favored national 
treatment (Article 4), minimum standard of treatment (Article 5), compensation 
for losses (Article6), expropriation and compensation (Article 7), transfers 
(Article 8)). 
121 Free Trade Agreement between the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China and the Government of New Zealand, Beijing, April 27, 
2008 (“China – New Zealand FTA”) Art. 152 Ch. 11, available at 
http://gjs.mofcom.gov.cn/accessory/200804/1208158780064.pdf. 
122 China – ASEAN FTA, supra note 70, art. 14(1), (“This Article shall 
apply to investment disputes between a Party and an investor of another Party 
concerning an alleged breach of an obligation of the former Party under Article 
4 (National Treatment), Article 5 (Most-Favored-Nation Treatment), Article 7 
(Treatment of Investment), Article 8 (Expropriation), Article 9 and Repatriation 
of Profits), which causes loss or damage to the investor in relation to its 
investment with respect to the management, conduct, operation, or sale or other 
disposition of an investment.”); see also Free Trade Agreement between the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the 
Republic of Singapore, Beijing, October 23, 2008 (“China-Singapore FTA”) 
Art. 84(1) (providing “Upon the conclusion of the [ASEAN-China Investment 
Agreement], the provisions of that agreement shall, mutatis mutandis, be 
incorporated into and form an integral part of this Agreement unless the context 
otherwise requires.”), available at http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english/index. 
shtml. 
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breaches of the substantive standards of the treaty,
123
 and with the 
scope of consent to arbitration found under Article 1116 of the NAFTA 
Treaty and Article 26(1) of the ECT.
124
 
 
B.  ARTICLE 25(4) OF THE ICSID CONVENTION 
The ISCID Convention also allows contracting states to make 
“notification of intent concerning classes of disputes” under Article 
25(4). Through this notification, contracting states may declare to 
ICSID, at the time of ratification, acceptance or approval of the ICSID 
convention or at any time thereafter, the “class or classes of disputes 
which would or would not consider submitting to the jurisdiction of 
ICSID.”125  This mechanism allows contracting states to make known 
in advance which matters they were willing or not willing to submit to 
the jurisdiction of ISCID.
126
 
Some contracting states have notified their intention to exclude 
many different types of disputes, such as rationae materiae, narrowing 
the scope of consent, providing requirements as to the investment 
(permission of the investment required), as to the economic field of the 
investment (oil, mineral natural resources, real estate) or to add 
procedural requirements (exhaustion of local remedies). On January 7, 
1993, China made known pursuant to article 25(4) of the ICSID 
Convention that it “would only consider submitting to the jurisdiction 
of disputes over compensation resulting from expropriation and 
nationalization.”127 
As mentioned above, ICSID jurisdiction requires a double consent: 
first ratification of the ICSID Convention by the host state, and second, 
specific consent between the foreign investor and the host state to 
ICSID jurisdiction by inclusion of an ICSID arbitration clause in the 
relevant instrument (contract or BIT). The effect of notifications of 
intent has been debated. First, it was affirmed that they do not 
constitute a reservation to the ICSID Convention.
128
 Second, the 
                                                 
123 See SCHREUER, supra note 23, at 532, referring to Article 24 of the 
2004 US Model BIT; see also Shan & Gallagher, supra note 11, ¶ 8.49. 
124 SCHREUER, supra note 23, at 535. 
125 Id. at 921. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 ICSID Convention, Regulations, and Rules, Notifications by 
Contracting States, Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the 
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question was whether they affect the specific consent under Article 
25(1) of the ICSID Convention?  Article 25(4) of the ICSID 
Convention states that “Such notification shall not constitute the 
consent required by paragraph (1).” But does the notification of intent 
affect or stand in the way of the specific consent of a party to ICSID 
arbitration under a BIT?  This issue has arisen both in the context of 
BITs providing for a specific consent larger than that contemplated in a 
pre-existing notification of intent of the Contracting States and in the 
context of notifications of intent aimed at limiting the scope of the 
consent offered in preexisting BITs.
129
  It has been decided that consent 
to ICSID arbitration is only subject to specific consent and not to the 
notification of intent.  Therefore, the wording of a notification does not 
constitute consent nor does it stand in the way of consent.
130
  Therefore, 
China may not claim that its 1993 Notification was a bar to any offer to 
ICSID arbitration granting full jurisdiction to ICSID.  However, if the 
notification of intent serves “purposes of information only” and is 
designed to “avoid misunderstanding” and does not have “any direct 
legal consequence,”131 the 1993 notification could be used as a 
supplementary means of interpretation to “elucidate the parties’ intent” 
under the BIT pursuant to article 32 of VCLT.  
In Tza, Peru argued that the 1993 notification limited the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction.  Peru argued that similarity of the terms used in the 1993 
notification, on the one hand, and in the consent clause of the China-
Peru BIT (which provides “dispute involving the amount of 
compensation for expropriation” (Article 8(3)), on the other hand, 
showed China did not intend to arbitrate the type of dispute brought by 
Tza.  The argument prompted the tribunal to fully examine the issue. 
The arbitral tribunal rejected Peru’s argument:  
                                                                                                 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States,  
¶ 31 ICSID/15 (April 2006). 
129 E.g., News Release, ICSID, Ecuador’s Notification under Article 
25(4) of the ICSID Convention (Dec. 4, 2007) (indicating that it would not 
consent to ICSID arbitration of disputes pertaining to investments in natural 
resources, such as oil, gas, and minerals), available at 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&action
Val=OpenPage&PageType=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=Announcment
s&pageName= Announcement9.  
130 Id.  
131 ICSID Convention, Regulations, and Rules, supra note 1, ¶ 31. 
132 Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, 
Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence, ¶ 165 (Feb. 12, 2007).  
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It would be questionable to interpret the consent of 
the parties to the BIT under Article 8 thereof based 
on the notification which addresses a completely 
different treaty such as the ICSID Convention, the 
wording whereof does not even constitute the consent 
of the PRC to the convention. For these reasons, the 
tribunal does not consider that the notification of the 
PRC pursuant to Article 25 of the Convention would 
invalidate the scope of Article 8 of the BIT when it is 
interpreted in accordance with Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention.
132
 
 
C.  INTERPRETATION OF CONSENT CLAUSES 
The interpretation of consent clauses, which determine the 
jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, is subject to international law and 
not to the law applicable to the merits of the dispute.
133
 In ICSID 
arbitration, the issue is governed principally by Article 25 rather then 
Article 42 of the Convention.
134
 The VCLT is commonly used by 
arbitral tribunals to interpret the specific provisions of BITs to 
determine the parties’ consent. 
1.  PRINCIPLES OF TREATY INTERPRETATION AND ROLE OF PRIOR 
ARBITRAL AWARDS 
(a)  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) 
Investment treaties like any treaty instrument need to be 
interpreted. Some BITs and FTAs provide internal guidance for rules of 
interpretation. For example, the China-New Zealand FTA provides 
“[f]or the avoidance of doubt, the Parties agree that the provisions of 
this Agreement shall be clarified in accordance with the customary 
rules of treaty interpretation of public international law.”135 
In international law, principles of interpretation have been 
developed so as to form a set of maxims of interpretation adopted by 
international tribunals, such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ).  
These customary rules have been codified in the VCLT, which sets out 
the law and procedure for the making, operation and termination of a 
                                                 
 
133 Schreuer, Consent to Arbitration, supra note 81, at 864-66. 
134
 SCHREUER, supra note 23, at 248, Fn783. 
135 China-New Zealand FTA, supra note 69, at art. 190(3). 
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treaty. The VCLT was adopted on May 22, 1969 and entered into force 
on January 27, 1980.
136
 Article 31 of the VCTL provides for the three 
basic principles of treaty interpretation:  good faith, ordinary meaning 
of the treaty terms in their context and the treaty’s object and purpose. 
Article 32 of the VCTL provides for the use of supplementary means of 
interpretation, such as preparatory documents used in the negotiations 
leading to the execution of the treaty.
137
 
The rules of interpretation contained in Articles 31 and 32 are 
today universally adopted. They have been recognized by the ICJ as 
being an accurate statement of customary international law.
138
 The 
VCTL is commonly used to interpret treaties by the WTO’s dispute 
settlement body,
139
 by arbitral tribunals for the settlement of investment 
treaty based disputes,
140
 as well as applied by domestic courts in the 
context of applications to set aside arbitral awards.
141
  
                                                 
136 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 43. 
137 DUNGAN, supra note 79, at 204-13; accord ANDREW NEWCOMBE & 
LLUIS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES: STANDARDS OF 
TREATMENT 108-19 (Wolters Kluwer Int’l 2009), Thomas Wälde, Interpreting 
Investment Treaties: Experience and Examples, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 724 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2009), Christoph 
Schreuer, Diversity and Harmonization of Treaty Interpretation in Investment 
Arbitration, 3 TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTE MGMT. 129, Apr.  2006.  
138 “These principles are reflected in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which may in many respects be considered 
as a codification of existing customary international law on the point.” Case 
Concerning the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal), 
Summary of the Judgment, I.C.J. 220-24 (Nov. 12, 1991); see also Territorial 
Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgment, I.C.J Reports 6,  ¶ 41(Feb. 
3, 1994); Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United 
States), Judgment, I.C.J Reports 161, ¶ 41 (Nov. 6, 2003). 
139 “This rule has received its most authoritative and succinct expression 
in the [VCTL]… That general rule of interpretation has attained the status of a 
rule of customary or general international law.” See Appellate Body Report, 
United States: Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline ¶ 20, 
WT/DS2/AB/R, (Apr. 29, 1996).  
140 Siemens A.G.  v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 80 (Aug. 3, 2004).   
141 “A treaty is governed by International law, which includes the rules of 
interpretation. The international rules on treaty interpretation are set out in 
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention…The rules set out in Articles 31 
and 32 of the Vienna Convention have been accepted by the International Court 
of Justice as being an accurate statement of customary International law and are 
therefore part of English law,” Czech Republic v. European Media Ventures, 
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Treaty interpretation by arbitral tribunals begins with reference to 
the principles formulated by Articles 31-32 of the VCTL.  However, 
use of these provisions is not always consistent and reflects different 
approaches, such as the textual and the object, purpose and effective 
approach (teleological approach). Also, tribunals do not hesitate to 
combine these principles or to depart from them by adopting alternative 
interpretation methods, such as dictionary definitions, state practice, 
travaux preparatoires, effet utile. Some most recent BITs and FTAs, 
like the NAFTA Treaty, Article 1131, add that a joint interpretation of 
the BIT shall be binding.
142
  
In addition to the Tza decision on jurisdiction, six other decisions 
(five published awards and a High Court decision) rendered between 
2006 and 2009 have had the occasion to interpret consent clauses 
limited to dispute on the amount of the compensation such as the one 
found in the China-Peru BIT 1994.
143
 All of them adopted the VCTL as 
a reference for the interpretation of the BIT consent clause. 
In Berschader v. The Russian Federation, the Tribunal had to 
examine an objection to jurisdiction raised by the Russian Federation. 
The Federation claimed that the issue of jurisdiction had to be 
considered in light of the applicable Belgium/Luxemburg-Russian 
Treaty, Russian Law and generally accepted norms and principles of 
international law.
144
  The arbitral tribunal found that only the VCTL 
applied to the issue: 
The Tribunal finds that the principle source of law 
applicable to the question of the Tribunal’s 
                                                                                                 
[2007] EWHC (Comm) 2851, [2007] 2 C.L.C. 908 (Eng.); see also Ecuador v. 
Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co., (2005) EWHC (Comm) 774.  
142 See China-Mexico BIT, supra note 120.   
143 Berschader v. Russian Federation (Berschader), Arb. Inst. of 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Award, Case No. V 080/2004 (Apr. 21, 
2006) (involving the Belgium/Luxembourg-Russian BIT of 1989); RosInvest 
Co. UK Ltd. v. Russian Federation (RosInvest), Arb. Inst. Of Stockholm 
Chamber of Commerce, Award on Jurisdiction, Case No. V 079/2005 (Oct. 
2007) (involving the UK-Russian BIT of 1989); Renta 4 S.V.S.A et al. v. 
Russian Federation (Renta4), Arb. Inst. of Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, 
Award on Preliminary Objections, Case No. V 024/2007 (Mar. 20, 2009) 
(involving the Spanish-Russian BIT of 1991); Austrian Airlines v. Slovak 
Republic (Austrian Airlines), UNCITRAL, Final Award (Oct. 9, 2009) 
(involving the Austrian-Czech BIT of 1990), available at http://italaw.com/ 
alphabetical_list_content.htm; European Media Ventures, supra note 19. 
144 Berschader, ¶ 95-96. 
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jurisdiction must be provisions of the Treaty. Insofar 
as the terms of the Treaty are unclear or require 
interpretation or supplementation, the Vienna 
Convention requires the tribunal to consider ‘the 
relevant rules of international law applicable in 
relations between the parties.’ 
The Vienna Convention provides no role for the 
domestic law of contracting states in the 
interpretation of international treaties. Therefore, in 
the instant case, it is clear that Russian national law is 
of no relevance in that regard. While Russian law 
may be relevant in establishing certain factual 
circumstances involved in the merits of the case, it 
has no role to play in determining the jurisdiction of 
the tribunal.
145
 
The Tza tribunal also used the VCTL as a guide for interpretation 
of the treaty provisions, and held: “The Vienna Convention on the law 
of treaties constitutes the main guide to interpret treaties based in 
international law, in particular Articles 31 and 32.”146 
It was also the case in Austrian Airlines v. The Slovak Republic, 
where the ad-hoc arbitral tribunal, which had to determine whether it 
had jurisdiction over the expropriation claim made by the claimant, 
found that the VCLT ‘guided’ its interpretation in the review of the 
scope of the consent clause (article 8 of the Austria-Czech BIT 
1990).
147
 
In RosInvest v. The Russian Federation, the tribunal applied the 
VCLT not as customary international law but as a legal obligation of 
the Contracting States to the BIT: 
[T]he present is one of those cases – surprisingly rare 
in practice – in which the Vienna Convention is more 
than just a convenient reference point for the rules of 
general international law, but is in fact a treaty in 
force between the Russian Federation and the United 
Kingdom, and which is entered into force before the 
IPPA itself was negotiated and concluded. The 
                                                 
145 Id. 
146 Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, 
Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence, ¶ 38 (Feb. 12, 2007).   
147 Austrian Airlines v. Slovak Republic (Austrian Airlines), 
UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 95 (Oct. 9, 2009). 
2011] THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTOR STATE DISPUTES  33 
 AND CHINA: NEW DEVELOPMENTS ON ICSID 
 JURISDICTION 
 
consequence is that, under the terms of its Article 4, 
the Vienna Convention applies as a matter of legal 
obligation to the interpretation and application of the 
IPPA.
148
 
The same approach was used in Renta4 v. The Russian Federation. 
Article 10 of the applicable Spanish-Russian BIT provided for the 
arbitral tribunal to base its decisions on the provisions of the BIT, the 
national legislation of the host state, the universally recognized norms 
and principles of international law (¶ 5 of the award on jurisdiction).
149
  
The tribunal found that the BIT “is an international instrument that if 
necessary falls to be interpreted in accordance with the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of treaties. Both Spain and Russia are parties to 
that Convention.”150  
 
(b)  Role of Prior Arbitral Awards 
An important secondary source of interpretation is also found in 
arbitral awards rendered on the same subject.
151
 The publication of 
investment arbitral awards allows arbitrators to take into account earlier 
rendered decisions which involve similar fact patterns; e.g. foreign 
investment cases subsequent to the Argentina crisis of 1999, or treaty 
clauses worded in similar terms such as scope of consent clauses and 
MFN clauses. It is also particularly true for the definition of recurrent 
concepts such as “investor,” “nationality” and “investment” of Article 
25 of the ICSID Convention. Although there is no doctrine of precedent 
in international law,
152
 counsel appearing before international arbitral 
tribunals do make reference to and rely on the principles established in 
                                                 
148 RosInvest Co. UK Ltd. v. Russian Federation (RosInvest), Arb. Inst. 
Of Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Award on Jurisdiction, Case No. V 
079/2005, ¶ 38 (Oct. 2007). 
149 Renta 4 S.V.S.A et al. v. Russian Federation (Renta4), Arb Inst. of 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Award on Preliminary Objections, Case 
No. V 024/2007 (Mar. 20, 2009). 
150 Id. ¶ 15. 
151 NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 137, at 101-06; Gabrielle 
Kaufmann-Kohler, The 2006 Freshfields Lecture. Arbitral Precedent: Dream, 
Necessity or Excuse?,23 ARB. INT’L. 357 (2007); Paulsson, supra note 92, at 
241-65; Wälde, supra note 137, at 724.  
152 Article 59 of the Statute of the ICJ provides for res judicata and not 
precedent: “The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the 
parties and in respect of that particular case.” ICSID Convention, Regulations 
and Rules, supra note 1, at ¶ 25. 
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earlier decisions.  Arbitrators then refer to the status to be given to 
earlier awards in a special section of the award in the preliminary issues 
next to applicable law and undisputed facts,
153
 or to outline in the 
reasoning of this source of interpretation.
154
  Arbitral tribunals 
frequently recall at the same time the lack of precedential effect of 
earlier cases and the conditions upon which the current case may rely 
on or depart from these decisions.  
In Berschader, while Russia, the respondent, claimed the case had 
to be decided solely on Russian law without recourse to international 
law or international case law, the tribunal found international 
investment case law to be a “persuasive source of law:” 
While such case law and practice is in no way 
binding upon the Tribunal or parties, the Tribunal 
must, nonetheless, be entitled to consider and take 
into account the conclusions of others arbitral 
tribunals who have addressed similar issues with 
respect to similar treaties and identical provisions. 
Moreover, jurisprudence and doctrine emanating 
from the decisions of international tribunals and the 
works of learned authors is frequently referred to as a 
source of international law for the purpose of 
interpreting treaty under the Vienna Convention.
155
 
In RosInvest, the tribunal also agreed to give consideration to earlier 
decisions: 
It is at all events plain that the decisions of other 
tribunals are not binding on this Tribunal . . . . This 
does not however preclude the Tribunal from 
                                                 
153 The Austrian Airlines tribunal devoted in its General Consideration a 
section named “Relevance of Previous Awards and Decisions of other 
Tribunals.” Austrian Airlines v. Slovak Republic (Austrian Airlines), 
UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶  83-84 (Oct. 9, 2009). 
154  In Tza, the Tribunal outlined the same level of consideration given to 
earlier decisions than to articles 31 and 32 VCLT by dividing its discussion on 
the scope of the consent clause (Article 8 of the Peru-China BIT) into three 
sections respectively devoted to the interpretation in accordance with Article 31 
VCLT, in accordance with 32 VCLT and interpretation “based on other arbitral 
decisions and awards.” Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/07/6, Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence, ¶ 173 (Feb. 12, 
2007).    
155 Berschader v. Russian Federation (Berschader), Arb. Inst. of 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Award, Case No. V 080/2004, ¶ 97 (Apr. 
21, 2006).  
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considering other arbitral decisions and the 
arguments of the Parties based upon them, to the 
extent that it may find that they throw any useful 
light on the issues that arise for decision in this 
case.
156
  
The Austrian Airlines tribunal adopted the solution established in 
Saipem v Bangladesh on the Tribunal’s “duty to adopt solution 
established in a series of consistent cases,”157 and concluded: 
The tribunal considers that it is not bound by 
previous decisions. At the same time, it is of the 
opinion that it must pay due consideration to earlier 
decisions of international tribunal. It believes that, 
subject to compelling contrary grounds, it has a duty 
to adopt solutions established in a series of consistent 
cases. It also believes that, subject to the specifics of 
a given treaty and of the circumstances of the actual 
case, it has a duty to seek to meet the legitimate 
expectations of the community of States and 
investors towards certainty of the rule of law.
158
 
Likewise, the Renta4 tribunal expressed its attentiveness to other 
cases brought to its attention by the parties. However, It also expressed 
the its desire to reach a decision case by case, rather than enforcing a 
duty of making consistent decisions (as in Austrian Airlines above).  
Therefore, the tribunal in Renta4 limited the effect of other decisions’ 
to those constituting “fully reasoned” cases, as opposed to series of 
“consistent” cases (as in Austrian Airlines).159   
                                                 
156 RosInvest Co. UK Ltd. v. Russian Federation (RosInvest), Arb. Inst. 
Of Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Award on Jurisdiction, Case No. V 
079/2005, ¶ 49 (Oct. 2007). 
157 Saipem v. Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7, Award, ¶ 90 
(June, 30, 2009). See also Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi AS v. 
Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶ 145 (Aug. 27, 2009).  
158 Austrian Airlines, ¶ 83-84. 
159 Renta 4 S.V.S.A et al. v. Russian Federation, Arb Inst. of Stockholm 
Chamber of Commerce, Award on Preliminary Objections, Case No. V 
024/2007, ¶ 16 (Mar. 20, 2009), “The present Parties are entitled to a decision 
based on the arbitrators’ examination of the facts and arguments presented in 
this case. The arbitrators do not in any event operate in a hierarchical and 
unitary system which requires them to follow precedent . . . . Moreover they are 
inclined to do so on the premise that there is value in considering the reasoning 
of decision-makers who have given careful attention to issues similar to those 
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In Tza, The application of these principles of interpretation and 
prior decisions will be examined infra in light of the scope of the 
consent clause and of the MFN clause. 
 
2.  INTERPRETATION OF CONSENT CLAUSES BY ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS 
A few decisions have interpreted the limited consent clauses found 
in the Russian, Czech and Hungarian and now Chinese BITs by arbitral 
tribunals, either ICSID, SCC or ad-hoc in light of the above principles 
of interpretation. The subject matter of the arbitration clauses of the 
relevant BITs basically covered “disputes on the quantum of an 
indemnity” for expropriation. The wording of the provision was in each 
case unique but the decisions when compared show two main trends of 
interpretation. In three of the cases, Berschader, RosInvest and Austrian 
Airlines,
160
 the arbitral tribunal found that the arbitration clause did not 
cover the dispute over entitlement to an indemnity. In three other cases, 
European Media Ventures SA, Tza and Renta4,
161
 the High Court and 
the arbitral tribunals respectively, found that the wording of the clause 
allowed such examination.  
(a)  Arbitral tribunals that rejected jurisdiction 
In Berschader, the relevant consent clause interpreted by the 
arbitral tribunal constituted under the auspices of the SCC covered 
“disputes concerning the amount or mode of compensation to be paid 
under Article 5 of the present [expropriation, nationalization or other 
measures having a similar effect].”162 In RosInvest, the consent clause 
provided for “disputes . . . concerning the amount of payment or 
                                                                                                 
that arise here. The arbitrators would be hesitant to depart from a proposition 
followed in a series of fully reasoned decisions reflecting jurisprudence 
constante.” 
160 Berschader v. Russian Federation (Berschader), Arb. Inst. of 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Award, Case No. V 080/2004, ¶ 129 (Apr. 
21, 2006).  
161 Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, 
Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence, ¶ 188 (Feb. 12, 2007); Renta4, ¶ 28.  
162 Berschader, quoting in full Treaty Between the Governments of the 
Kingdom of Belgium and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, and the 
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Promotion and 
Mutual Protection of Investments, Belg.-Lux-U.S.S.R., Feb. 9, 1989, 1996 
U.N.T.S. 312 (unofficial English translation). Article 5 provides: “Investments 
made by investors of one Contracting Party in the territory of the other 
Contracting Party may not be expropriated, nationalized, or subjected to any 
other measures having a similar effect.”  
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compensation under Article 4 or 5 [expropriation] of this Agreement or 
concerning any other matter consequential upon an act of expropriation 
in accordance with Article 5 of this Agreement” (Article 8(1) of the 
1988 UK-Soviet BIT/IPPA) and the BIT did not provide for a forum 
for disputes on liability.
163
  
The reasoning adopted in these three decisions to decline 
jurisdiction on the entitlement to an indemnity for expropriation shows 
the tribunals search for the ordinary meaning of the clause.  Thereafter 
the meaning of the terms is explored in the context of the expropriation 
clause only. Finally, the tribunals, in support of their primary findings, 
use some supplementary means of interpretation such as travaux 
preparatoires or treaty practice. 
First, the arbitral tribunals affirmed the clarity of the relevant 
terms: “The tribunal is of the view that the ordinary meaning of the 
[Article being interpreted] is quite clear.”164  They immediately affirm 
that the words, based on their ordinary meaning, work as a limitation or 
a qualification of the types of dispute contemplated under the 
expropriation clause to which they refer.  The Berschader tribunal held 
that “[t]he wording expressly limits the type of disputes, which may be 
subjected to arbitration under the Treaty, to a dispute concerning the 
amount or mode of compensation to be paid in the event of an 
expropriatory act.”165 
Likewise in Austrian Airlines, the arbitrators said: 
[The words] mean that only disputes “concerning the 
amount or the conditions of payment of a 
compensation” can be submitted to arbitration. The 
scope of Article 8 is therefore limited to disputes 
                                                 
163 RosInvest Co. UK Ltd. v. Russian Federation (RosInvest), Arb. Inst. 
Of Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Award on Jurisdiction, Case No. V 
079/2005, ¶ 57 (Oct. 2007).  
164 Berschader, ¶ 152; see also Austrian Airlines, supra note 147, ¶ 96: 
“The ordinary meaning of Article 8(1) arises from the words used in that 
provision which are clear by themselves.”  
165 Berschader, ¶ 152. The use of the ordinary meaning made in 
Berschader was criticized in Renta4, as amounting to no analysis: “This is no 
more than a restatement of the problem. It is necessary to determine whether 
these words exclude disputes over entitlement to compensation (with the effect 
of limiting jurisdiction to mere quantification or mode of payment).” Renta 4 
S.V.S.A et al. v. Russian Federation, Arb Inst. of Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce, Award on Preliminary Objections, Case No. V 024/2007, ¶ 24 
(Mar. 20, 2009) (emphasis omitted).  
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about the amount of the compensation and does not 
extend to the review of the principle of 
expropriation.
166
  
Second, the arbitral tribunals interpreted the “ordinary meaning [of 
the words] in their context,” by limiting the “context” to the sole 
provision of the BIT to which the arbitration clause expressly referred, 
the expropriation clause.  They made no mention of the treaties “object 
and purpose” or of any right of the investor to international arbitration.  
Rather they hold that the ordinary meaning of the provision excluded 
disputes concerning “whether or not an act of expropriation actually 
occurred under Article 5.”167 If such a dispute occurred, this tribunal 
believed it would have to be resolved by the dispute procedure agreed 
in the contract or in the domestic courts of the host state.
168
 
In RosInvest, the relevant part of the arbitration clause covered two 
subject matters relating to expropriation, namely: (i) “the amount or 
payment of compensation under” Articles 4 or 5 of the Agreement 
(First Jurisdiction Clause), and (ii) “concerning any other matter 
consequential upon an act of expropriation in accordance with Article 5 
of this Agreement” (Second Jurisdiction Clause).169 As to the First 
Jurisdiction clause covering “the amount or payment of compensation,” 
the RosInvest Tribunal’s analysis was based upon its interpretation of 
the reference to Article 5.
170
 The tribunal found that the order and the 
                                                 
166 Austrian Airlines v. Slovak Republic (Austrian Airlines), 
UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶  96 (Oct. 9, 2009), see also RosInvest Co. UK Ltd. 
v. Russian Federation (RosInvest), Arb. Inst. Of Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce, Award on Jurisdiction, Case No. V 079/2005, ¶ 110-115 (Oct. 
2007). 
167 Berschader v. Russian Federation (Berschader), Arb. Inst. of 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Award, Case No. V 080/2004, ¶ 153 (Apr. 
21, 2006). 
168 Berschader, ¶ 152–53. Once again this approach was criticized in 
Renta 4: “This is a simple affirmation. It does not appear to be supported by 
analysis. . . . Words may have an “ordinary meaning” as units of language. It 
does not follow that their import is self-evident when viewed in context.” 
Renta4, supra note 149, ¶ 25-26.  
169 RosInvest, ¶ 110-115 (quoting Article 8.1 of the UK-Russian BIT). 
170 Id. ¶ 111–12. Article 5(1) of the UK-Russian BIT provided 
“Investments of investors of either Contracting Party shall not be nationalized, 
expropriated or subjected to measures having effect equivalent to 
nationalization or expropriation (hereinafter referred to as “expropriation”) in 
the territory of the other Contracting Party except for a purpose which is in the 
public interest and is not discriminatory and against the payment, without 
delay, of adequate and effective compensation. Such compensation shall 
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wording of the expropriation clause in Article 5, introducing the 
compensation in the second half of the provision and as the last of the 
three exceptions to the principle that an investment cannot be 
expropriated, supported their interpretation of the limitation of the 
jurisdictional clause.
171
 
As to the Second Jurisdiction Clause, the RosInvest tribunal also 
concluded that “any other matter consequential upon an act of 
expropriation” had to exclude entitlement to compensation.172  
Focusing on the word “consequential,” the tribunal found the clause 
could not sensibly be read to include “expropriation” claims or it would 
render “these preconditions … meaningless.”173 
The Austrian Airlines tribunal’s use of the expropriation clause 
(Article 4(4) and 4(5) of the Austrian-Slovak BIT) to confirm the 
context of the arbitration clause to interpret its ordinary meaning may 
have been prompted by the particular wording of the expropriation 
clause and reference to the “unmistakable meaning of Articles 8 and 
4.”174  The expropriation clause under Article 4 contained a cross 
reference to the arbitration clause (Article 8), while this was not the 
case in the two above mentioned Russian BITs where only the 
arbitration clause referred to the expropriation clause. The tribunal also 
noted that Article 4(4) provided for a forum choice before state courts 
for disputes relating to the “‘legitimacy’ of the expropriation,” whereas 
Article 4(5) gave the investor a choice to challenge the amount of 
compensation before either a local court or an arbitral tribunal: “Claims 
about the principle of expropriation are for the local authorities under 
Article 4(4) and claims about the amount of compensation are for the 
local authorities or for an arbitral tribunal under Articles 4(5) and 8.”175  
Third, the awards do not use the ‘object and purpose’ of the BIT to 
construe the interpretation of the intent of the parties.  Instead, they 
make extensive use of contextual documents, such as travaux 
preparatoires and treaty practice. Under Article 32 of the VCLT, 
travaux preparatoires constitute a supplementary means of 
                                                                                                 
amount to the real value of the investment expropriated immediately before the 
expropriation or before the impending expropriation became public 
knowledge….” (Emphasis added).  
171 Id.  
172 Id. ¶ 115–16. 
173 Id. 
174 Austrian Airlines v. Slovak Republic (Austrian Airlines), 
UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶  110 (Oct. 9, 2009). 
175 Id. ¶ 97-98.  
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interpretation used to confirm the meaning resulting from the primary 
means of interpretation (Article 31 of the VCLT), or when the meaning 
is ambiguous or obscure; or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd 
or unreasonable.
176
 As noted above, travaux preparatoires were used in 
Austrian Airlines in support of the Tribunal’s findings: 
The tribunal’s conclusions are further supported by 
the travaux preparatoires of the treaty. The 
negotiation history shows that the final wording of 
Article 8 is the result of a process by which the scope 
of the disputes subject to arbitration was purposefully 
restricted … one can only deduct from this sequence 
of texts that the Contracting States deliberately 
narrowed down the initially broad scope of arbitral 
disputes.
177
 
In Berschader, as noted in the award, the arbitral tribunal was not 
provided with travaux preparatoires, but it also refused to give weight 
to the Belgian MFA’s explanatory statement on the Belgium-Soviet 
BIT prepared for the purpose of the ratification of that treaty by the 
Belgian Parliament.
178
  In that document, the consent clause was 
defined as an arbitration clause that covered all disputes over 
expropriation.
179
 The tribunal refused to explore this document based 
on the finding that “the language of the treaty [was] quite clear and in 
the view of the Tribunal such language could not possibly lend itself to 
the interpretation suggested in the explanatory statement.”180  Indeed, 
as noted by commentators, caution is required with “unilateral 
statements” in the ratification process.181 Nevertheless, “ratification 
                                                 
176 See Christoph Schreuer, Diversity and Harmonization of Treaty 
Interpretation in Investment Arbritation 18 (Feb. 7, 2006), available at 
http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/pdf/cspubl_85.pdf. See also Walde, supra note 
127, at 777: “In practice, the travaux are as unreliable in deciding difficult 
interpretation issues as they are always invoked if they appear to helpful to 
counsel or tribunal.” 
177 Austrian Airlines, ¶ 105–07.  
178 Berschader v. Russian Federation (Berschader), Arb. Inst. of 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Award, Case No. V 080/2004, ¶ 158 (Apr. 
21, 2006).  
179 Id. 
180 Austrian Airlines v. Slovak Republic (Austrian Airlines), 
UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶  105-07 (Oct. 9, 2009). 
181 See Christoph Schreuer, Diversity and Harmonization of Treaty 
Interpretation in Investment Arbitration, supra note 17, at 18; see also Walde, 
supra note 137, at 778, “as they may simply record a view of an ambiguous 
text by one delegation, which is not shared by the others; it may even involve 
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memoranda tend to paint a particular innocuous view of the treaty in 
order not to wake up sleeping wolves during ratification.”182 
Furthermore, assuming the Berschader tribunal’s decision was based 
on a conservative application of Article 32 VCLT, implying that the 
use of supplementary means of interpretation, such as an explanatory 
statement, may arise only where the clause in ambiguous, one may 
wonder why the same tribunal needed to use state practice with third 
parties, something that is not even a mean of interpretation 
contemplated in the VCLT. The decision of the Berschader tribunal 
shows that supplementary means of interpretations are excluded when 
they alter the tribunal’s interpretation of the ordinary meaning and are 
adopted only when they confirm it. 
The Berschader and RosInvest tribunals both interpreted the treaty 
in light of the current and subsequent treaty practice of the host state, 
Russia, with third countries (France, UK and Canada) in order to 
outline a change of policy that confirmed their interpretation: 
[T]he majority of these early BITs illustrate an 
identifiable practice on the part of the Soviet Union, 
which corresponds with the policy considerations 
alleged by the Respondent to lie behind the restrictive 
wording of Article 10 of the Treaty. Moreover, it is 
interesting to note that a the definite change of policy 
can be observed in the BITs concluded by the 
Russian Federation in the late 1990s subsequent to 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The arbitration 
clauses in these later BITs are generally much 
broader in their scope and, undoubtedly, encompass 
disputes concerning the occurrence of an act of 
expropriation. This further indicates that the 
restrictive wording of Article 10 arose from the 
                                                                                                 
an attempt by a delegation to achieve by unilateral interpretative conduct what 
they did not obtain by negotiation.” See also the ad-hoc decision in Malaysian 
Historical Salvors SDN BHD v. Government of Malaysia, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/10, Decision on the Application for Annulment, ¶ 57 (Apr. 16, 2009) 
“In any event, courts and tribunal interpreting treaties regularly review the 
travaux preparatoires whenever they are brought to their attention; it is 
mythological to pretend that they are brought to their attention; it is 
mythological to pretend that they do so only when they first conclude that the 
term requiring interpretation is ambiguous or obscure.”    
182 Walde, supra note 137, at 724. 
42 SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF [Vol. 8.1 
 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS 
 
deliberate intention of the Contracting Parties to limit 
the scope of arbitration.
183
 
As noted by authors, tribunals have repeatedly looked at other 
BITs in interpreting the treaty in question as they “can shed light on the 
meaning of a term or the function of a treaty mechanism.”184 However, 
the use of treaty practice with other parties, as opposed to state practice 
between the treaty parties as contemplated under Article 31(2) of the 
VCLT, to ascertain state policies denies the simple fact revealed by 
their examination: every BIT is unique and the result of a particular 
negotiation that renders state practice with other states irrelevant for the 
purpose of ascertaining the meaning of that BIT. Indeed, the variety of 
wording in limited wide consent clauses shows it is hard to ascertain 
the same consequences from similarities identified in other treaties but 
taken out of context.
185
 This will be seen below in the three cases that 
accepted jurisdiction. 
 
(b)  Arbitral tribunals that have accepted jurisdiction 
In European Media Ventures, the English High Court examined an 
application to set aside an award, pursuant to section 67(1)(a) of the 
English Arbitration Act 1996, made by the Czech Republic on the 
grounds that the arbitral tribunal lacked jurisdiction. In its ad-hoc 
award on jurisdiction made in London, the arbitral tribunal had to 
construe the scope of consent clause of the Belgian/Luxembourg-Czech 
BIT 1989 providing for disputes “concerning compensation due by 
virtue of article 3 paragraphs (1) and (3) [expropriation].”186 It had 
found that such scope was not limited to issues of quantification.  
                                                 
183 Berschader v. Russian Federation (Berschader), Arb. Inst. of 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Award, Case No. V 080/2004, ¶ 155 (Apr. 
21, 2006).   
184 See Walder, supra note 137, at 767. 
185 See Mox Plant Case (Ir. v. U.K.), ITLOS Case No. 10, Order ¶ 51 
(Dec. 3, 2001); see also RosInvest Co. UK Ltd. v. Russian Federation 
(RosInvest), Arb. Inst. Of Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Award on 
Jurisdiction, Case No. V 079/2005, ¶ 39 (Oct. 2007). 
186 Id. at ¶ 8. The opinion noted that “[t]he Tribunal provided its 
interpretation of that limitation as follows: ‘It would seem to exclude from that 
jurisdiction any claim for relief other  than compensation (e.g. a claim for 
restitution or a declaration that a contract was still in force).’” Id. at ¶ 9. The 
Award on Jurisdiction rendered on May 15, 2007 in London under the 
UNCITRAL arbitration Rules is not published.  
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The Renta4 tribunal had to examine the scope of the Spanish-
Russian BIT consent clause which covered disputes “relating to the 
amount or method of payment of the compensation due under Article 6 
(nationalization, expropriation) of this Agreement.”187 The Tza tribunal 
had to construe the scope of the Peru-China BIT consent clause which 
covered “disputes involving the amount of compensation for 
expropriation.”188 Under Article 8 of the Peru-China BIT, the 
contracting states had agreed that any dispute connected with an 
investment be examined by the state courts of the host state
189
 and 
added that (i) disputes involving the amount of compensation for 
expropriation be submitted to ICSID, and (ii) any other disputes 
concerning other matters be submitted to ICSID subject to the parties’ 
agreement.
190
 The reasoning adopted in these three cases to retain 
jurisdiction on the entitlement to an indemnity for expropriation shows 
the search of an ordinary meaning based on a textual approach and in 
light of the expropriation clause but also the purpose and object of the 
treaty. Additionally, the tribunal referred to travaux preparatoires and 
prior decisions. 
First, these tribunals took a cautious step by departing from the 
view that the wording of the provision was clear or introduced a 
limitation.  The Tza tribunal first recalled that communist regimes were 
generally not familiar with independent tribunals and that this implied a 
“certain degree of distrust”191 which created a conflict between the 
positions of the negotiating parties to the consent clause and therefore 
some ambiguity.
192
  A virtually identical reasoning was applied by the 
tribunal in European Media Ventures, where another former socialist 
country was a signatory to the BIT.
193
 The compromise created an 
ambiguity: 
                                                 
187 Renta 4 S.V.S.A et al. v. Russian Federation, Arb Inst. of Stockholm 
Chamber of Commerce, Award on Preliminary Objections, Case No. V 
024/2007, ¶ 5 (Mar. 20, 2009), citing Spanish-Russian BIT, Art. 10.  
188 Peru-China BIT, supra note 12, at art. 8(3).  
189 Id. at art. 8(2). 
190 Id. at art. 8(3). 
191 Mox Plant, ¶ 145. 
192 Id. ¶ 149. As noted above the Renta4 tribunal refuted the assumption 
of a limited scope derived from the reading of the consent clause: “words may 
have an ‘ordinary meaning’ as units of language. It does not follow that their 
import is self-evident when viewed in context.” Renta4, ¶ 26.  
193 See Czech Republic v. European Media Ventures, [2007] EWHC 
(Comm) 2851, [2007] 2 C.L.C. 908 (Eng.).  
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In the present case each side appears to have adopted 
opposing negotiating positions, and there was a 
degree of compromise. In my view the arbitration 
provision of this Treaty fell into a further category, in 
which the width of the arbitration clause was left 
unclear: possibly to the satisfaction of both sides.
194
  
Second, in all three cases the textual approach to interpret the 
ordinary meaning of the term in their context was adopted by the 
arbitral tribunals.  For example, in European Media Ventures, the Court 
held: 
It is clear that the proper approach to the 
interpretation of Treaty wording is to identify what 
the words mean in their context (the textual method), 
rather than attempting to identify what may have 
been the underlying purpose in the use of the words 
(the teleological method).
195
 
Similar terms were used in Renta 4, “[w]ords may have an 
'ordinary meaning' as units of language. It does not follow that their 
import is self-evident when viewed in context.”196 
This approach to analyzing treaty language resulted in a broad 
interpretation of the consent clause. The terms of the arbitration clause 
were interpreted in their context and not in the context of the 
expropriation clause to which they nevertheless all refer. In utilizing 
this textual approach, the tribunals used the dictionary to interpret and 
weight the surrounding terms used in the clause, such as “involving the 
amount of compensation for expropriation,”197 “concerning 
compensation due by virtue of ”198 or “compensation due under . . . 
.”199 European Media Ventures noted the tension between the wide 
meaning of these surrounding terms, on the one hand, and the limiting 
sense of the term compensation, on the other hand. The High Court 
                                                 
194 Id. ¶ 32. 
195 Id. ¶ 16.   
196 Renta 4 S.V.S.A et al. v. Russian Federation, Arb Inst. of Stockholm 
Chamber of Commerce, Award on Preliminary Objections, Case No. V 
024/2007, ¶ 26 (Mar. 20, 2009).     
197 Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, 
Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence, ¶ 129 (Feb. 12, 2007). Note in ¶ 151 
the use of the Oxford Dictionary to conclude ‘involving’ means “include” with 
no restriction thereto.  
198 European Media Ventures, ¶ 44-45. 
199 Renta4, ¶ 19. 
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nevertheless decided that the combination did not preclude them from 
hearing the preconditions to quantum, and found: 
The use of the word ‘compensation’ limits the scope 
of the arbitration. It may be contrasted with broad 
phrases such as ‘any disputes’ which may be found in 
other BITs. Its impact is to restrict the jurisdiction of 
the tribunal to one aspect of expropriation. The word 
‘concerning,’ however, is broad. The word is not 
linked to any particular aspect of ‘compensation.’ 
‘Concerning’ is similar to other common expressions 
in arbitration clauses, for example ‘relating to’ and 
‘arising out of.’ Its ordinary meaning is to include 
every aspect of its subject: in this case ‘compensation 
due by virtue of Paragraphs (1) and (3) of Article 3.’ 
As a matter of ordinary meaning this covers issues of 
entitlement as well as quantification.
200
 
The tribunal’s jurisdiction is therefore not limited by the reference 
to the expropriation clause in which the consent clause refers to 
quantum, but instead to all events contemplated by the expropriation 
clause. In particular, in European Media Ventures, the arbitration 
clause was referred to in Articles (3) and (1) of the BIT,
201
 the High 
Court found that all of the elements within the scope of Article (3) and 
(1) of the BIT
 were included in the international tribunal’s 
jurisdiction.
202 
 
                                                 
200 Czech Republic v. European Media Ventures, ¶ 44 [2007] EWHC 
(Comm) 2851, [2007] 2 C.L.C. 908 (Eng.).  
201 European Media Ventures, ¶ 6 (“Article 3(1): Investments made by 
investors of one of the Contracting Parties in the territory of the other 
Contracting Party may not be expropriated or subjected to other measures of 
direct or indirect dispossession, total or partial, having a similar effect, unless 
such measures are: 
(a) taken in accordance with a lawful procedure and are not 
discriminatory; 
(b) accompanied by provisions for the payment of compensation, which 
shall be paid to the investors in convertible currency and without delay. The 
amount shall correspond to the real value of the investments on the day before 
the measures were taken or made public. . . . 
Article 3(3): The provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 are applicable to 
investors of each Contracting Party, holding any form of participation in any 
company whatsoever in the territory of the other Contracting Party.”). 
202 European Media Ventures, ¶ 41. 
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In Renta4, Russia’s argument was that the words “amount or 
method of payment” in the consent clause (Article 10 of the BIT) 
allowed nothing but a narrow debate about quantum, timing, or 
currency of the compensation for expropriation. It further alleged that 
the word “due” meant that the dispute before the arbitrators was limited 
to amounts already established as “due” by a final decision, 
acknowledging that there has been a compensable event as defined in 
Article 6 (the expropriation clause). The tribunal refuted this 
interpretation: 
The Tribunal does not believe that the text allows a 
curtailment of the international tribunal’s authority to 
decide whether compensation is “due”. That perforce 
entrains the power to determine whether there has 
been a compensable event in the first place . . . . 
Article 6 defines the precondition of compensation 
being “due” for the purpose of Article 10. It is an 
aspect of Article 6 which cannot be beyond the 
arbitrators reach.
203
 
The same construction as in European Media Ventures lead the 
Renta4 tribunal to a somehow narrower subject-matter jurisdiction 
given a concession made by the Claimants in the course of the 
proceedings: the subject matter jurisdiction did not cover all aspects of 
compensation but compensation only.
204
  It did not extend to all aspects 
of expropriation.  The Tribunal therefore decided that the reference to 
                                                 
203 See Renta 4 S.V.S.A et al. v. Russian Federation, Arb Inst. of 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Award on Preliminary Objections, Case 
No. V 024/2007, ¶ 28 (Mar. 20, 2009). Article 6 of the Spain-Russian BIT 
provides: “Any nationalization, expropriation or any other measures having 
similar consequences taken by the authorities of either party against 
investments made within its territory by investors of the other party, shall be 
taken only on the grounds of public use and in accordance with the legislation 
in force in the territory. Such measures should on no account be discriminatory. 
The Party adopting such measures shall pay the investor or his beneficiary 
adequate compensation, without undue delay and in freely convertible 
currency.” 
204 The arbitrators are not asked to determine whether Russia has acted 
discriminatorily or without the justification of public purpose. Nor would they 
be entitled to do so given the Claimant’s concession (see paragraph 42 above). 
It is unnecessary to consider issues that might have arisen of this concession 
had not been made. (A familiar feature of this area of international law is 
precisely the proposition that the lawfulness or otherwise of a measure of 
dispossession may affect the amount of compensation.) 
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“compensation due under article 6” allowed its subject-matter 
jurisdiction to cover the last sentence of Article 6 only, namely: “The 
Party adopting such measures shall pay the investor or his beneficiary 
adequate compensation, without undue delay and in freely convertible 
currency,” i.e., whether there had been a “compensable 
expropriation.”205 The tribunal excluded from its jurisdiction the first 
two sentences of Article 6, which concern justification of expropriation 
for public purpose and discrimination, respectively.
206
 
Third, the object, purpose, and effectiveness approaches, which 
had not been discussed in the above awards rejecting jurisdiction, were 
used in Tza as well as in the two other arbitral decisions to reaffirm the 
tribunal’s findings using the textual interpretation.207 In Tza, and in the 
two other cases, the tribunal found that the object and purpose, by 
reference to the preamble of the treaty (purpose of conferring certain 
benefits to promote investments), and to the perception of the benefit of 
BITs by the foreign investor, extended entitlement to ICSID arbitration, 
internationalization of the dispute, or conferring a valuable right to 
arbitrate. In European Media Ventures, the High Court found: 
In these circumstances it seems it seems to me plain 
that in interpreting a BIT the Court is entitled to take 
into account that one of the objects of the treaty was 
to confer rights on an investor, including a valuable 
right to arbitrate. If the suggestion made in Ecuador 
v. Occidental (No.2) at §28, that it is permissible to 
resolve uncertainties in the interpretation of a BIT in 
favor of an investor, who is not a party to the treaty, 
is said to amount to a rule of interpretation, the 
suggestion goes rather further than appears to be 
justified in International law.
208
 
The Tza tribunal also referred to the inclusion of the entitlement to 
submit certain disputes to ICSID arbitration as an intention to confer 
certain benefits to promote investments.
209
 The Renta4 tribunal did the 
same, holding that investment is not promoted by purely formal or 
                                                 
205 Renta4, ¶ 63. 
206 Renta4, ¶ 46. 
207 Czech Republic v. European Media Ventures, ¶ 48 [2007] EWHC 
(Comm) 2851, [2007] 2 C.L.C. 908 (Eng.). 
208 European Media Ventures, ¶ 23. 
209 Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, 
Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence, ¶ 39 (Feb. 12, 2007).  
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illusory standards of protection. A fundamental advantage perceived by 
investors in “BITs is that of the internationalization of the host state’s 
commitments.” The tribunal said the “dispute would not be 
internationalized if the respondent State could simply declare whether 
there is an obligation to compensate for expropriation.”210 
What also follows from this interpretation is the principle of effet 
utile.  Not only is international arbitration within the ambit of the treaty 
guaranties, but its protection must also carry some weight, it must not 
lead to an “incoherent conclusion, namely that investor would never 
have access to arbitration.”211  
The interest in the effectiveness reasoning adopted in Tza resides 
in the wording of the dispute resolution of the China-Peru BIT 1994, 
which included a fork in the road clause. The consent clause is divided 
into three paragraphs: Article 8(1) provided for amicable settlement 
through consultation,
212
 Article 8(2) called for litigation in the host 
state courts, i.e., Peruvian courts in the present case.
213
 Finally, Article 
8(3) introduced the access to international arbitration in three 
sentences: (a) ICSID arbitration for disputes “involving the amount of 
compensation for expropriation,” (b) ICSID arbitration, subject to the 
parties’ agreement, for disputes concerning other matters, and (c) 
ICSID arbitration was excluded if the investor has had recourse to 
litigation in the host state courts. This last sentence (c) contained the 
fork in the road clause, and provided: “The provisions of this Paragraph 
shall not apply if the investor concerned has resorted to the procedure 
specified in Paragraph 2 of this Article [state courts].”214  
Peru’s position was that access to ICSID arbitration under Article 
8(3) was limited to disputes concerning the quantum of the 
compensation for expropriation under sentence (a) above. It claimed 
                                                 
210 Renta 4 S.V.S.A et al. v. Russian Federation, Arb Inst. of Stockholm 
Chamber of Commerce, Award on Preliminary Objections, Case No. V 
024/2007, ¶ 56 (Mar. 20, 2009).     
211 Tza, ¶ 154. 
212 China-Peru BIT, supra note 12, at art. 8(1) (“Any dispute between an 
investor of one Contracting Party and the other Contracting Party in connection 
with an investment in the territory of the other Contracting Party shall, as far as 
possible, be settled amicably through negotiations between the parties to the 
dispute.”). 
213 Id. at art. 8(2) (“If the dispute cannot be settled through negotiations 
within six months, either party to the dispute shall be entitled to submit this 
dispute to the competent court of the Contracting Party accepting the 
investment.”).  
214 Id. art. 8(3).  
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that since the parties had not agreed to submit the dispute over 
entitlement to compensation to ICSID arbitration under sentence (b) 
above, the treaty called for litigation in the Peruvian courts (Article 
8(2)) to solve the dispute over entitlement to compensation.
215
 The 
ICSID tribunal found that this three-step reading of the clause 
employed by Peru when compared with the reading of sentence (c) 
above led to an incoherent conclusion: recourse to state courts by the 
foreign investor, under sentence (c), prevents the application of the 
provisions of Article 8(3), and therefore precludes recourse to ICSID 
arbitration.
216
 The tribunal found that this last sentence (c) created a 
final choice of jurisdiction for the investors and amounted to a fork in 
the road, thus preventing subsequent recourse to ICSID arbitration as 
per (a). Should disputes over the entitlement to compensation be 
brought by an investor before State courts pursuant to Article 8(2), the 
fork in the road clause triggered an irrevocable choice not allowing any 
subsequent recourse to ICSID arbitration.
217
 Balancing the narrow 
interpretation of the scope of the clause sustained by Peru and the effect 
of the fork in the road clause preventing the internationalization of the 
dispute, the tribunal concluded that this was an “incoherent 
conclusion.”218 The principle of effectiveness, guided by the concern 
that the state’s promise of ICSID arbitration had to carry weight and 
could not be read as strictly denying any access to arbitration, led the 
ICSID tribunal to reject the textual approach alleged by Peru and to opt 
for a large interpretation of the scope of the consent clause.
219
  
Fourth, all of the tribunals’ decisions refer to travaux preparatoires 
in aid of their conclusion. While questioning their relevance for the 
purpose of treaty interpretation in some instances,
220
 the tribunals still 
                                                 
215 Tza, ¶ 147. 
216 Tza, ¶ 147-54. 
217 Id. 
218 Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, 
Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence, ¶ 154 (Feb. 12, 2007).  
219 Tza, ¶ 159. 
220 Czech Republic v. European Media Ventures, ¶ 31 [2007] EWHC 
(Comm) 2851, [2007] 2 C.L.C. 908 (Eng.), (“It seems to me that the court or 
tribunal's task is to interpret the Treaty rather than to interpret the 
supplementary means of interpretation. If the material relied on is unclear or 
equivocal it is unlikely to confirm or determine a meaning.”  “As already noted 
above, the task of the Court is not to search for a notional common intention; 
but to give a meaning to the words used in the context in which they came to be 
agreed.”); Renta 4 S.V.S.A et al. v. Russian Federation, Arb Inst. of Stockholm 
Chamber of Commerce, Award on Preliminary Objections, Case No. V 
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used them to validate the adopted interpretation.
221
 Echoing the 
decisions, and in a complete opposite ratio to RosInvest and 
Berschader, the tribunals examined both travaux preparatoires as 
contextual documents, and the Soviet and the Czech state practice. The 
tribunals found these texts were unclear and inconsistent, and therefore 
non-conclusive for the purpose of interpreting the intent of a limited 
consent. In European Media Ventures, the High Court found: 
In the present case each side appears to have adopted 
opposing negotiating positions, and there was a 
degree of compromise. In my view the arbitration 
provision of this Treaty fell into a further category, in 
which the width of the arbitration clause was left 
unclear: possibly to the satisfaction of both sides. I 
would add that I did not find material in which 
commentators sought to describe and explain the 
terms of the Treaty, by way of précis, to be of any 
significant assistance in the task of interpretation.
222
 
The Renta4 tribunal referred to the Russian participation 
mentioned previously in Berschader and to a paper on BITs published 
by one of the Russian negotiators.  The tribunal found that both sources 
were silent on the central issue before the arbitrators: the issue of the 
arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction to determine whether there had been an 
expropriation.
223
  However, it also said a series of BITs signed by the 
USSR in the years of perestroika, shortly before the dissolution of the 
Union, may be seen as a divergence from past socialist dogma which 
signaled the USSR’s acceptance of an international regime intended to 
reassure investors.
224
  
                                                                                                 
024/2007, ¶ 20 (Mar. 20, 2009).    , (“The premise that one may consider the 
intention of one of the parties to a BIT is questionable in the first place.”).  
221 Tza, ¶ 162 (“To dispel any doubts, the Tribunal has also sought 
guidance in supplementary interpretation means as authorized by Article 32, 
including preparatory works of the BIT and the circumstances surrounding its 
conclusion”); Renta4, ¶ 46 (“The textual approach above is sufficient to decide 
the issue at hand. There is strictly speaking no need to consider whether 
extraneous considerations confirm the conclusion. Nevertheless, the Tribunal 
believes it appropriate to explain why it finds that both evidence of the 
purported intentions of the parties and inferences as to object and purpose of 
the Spanish BIT validate the arbitrators’ conclusion”).  
222 European Media Ventures, ¶ 32. 
223 Renta4, ¶ 49-51. 
224 Id.  
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What was contemplated by commentators in view of the nature of 
early Chinese BITs was a test of the scope of these consent clauses 
before ICSID arbitration where China, as the host state, and respondent 
would challenge the international tribunal’s subject matter 
jurisdiction.
225
 In Tza, the host state was not the contracting party that 
asserted a national policy of a limited scope of consent state; instead, 
Peru had offered a consent clause covering all disputes during the 
negotiation. As noted in the award, the wording that appears in the 
China-Peru BIT 1994 had been prompted and drafted by the Chinese 
negotiators who had rejected Peru’s proposal of a wide consent clause 
as evidenced by the exchange between the negotiators.
226
 In the context 
of a south-south investment emanating from a Chinese investor, Peru 
was in a bataille a front renverse, relying on the restrictive state 
practice of the other contracting state. The tribunal found that both the 
Chinese negotiators’ reply and China’s practice of BITs, although 
revealing a restrictive practice, were not able to clearly assert that the 
consent was indeed limited to disputes involving only the amount of 
compensation for expropriation or involving any issue on 
expropriation.
227
  
Finally, we examine the role of prior decisions on consent clauses. 
Tza and Renta4 focus their analysis on Berschader, RosInvest and 
European Media Ventures.
228
 Both tribunals use prior awards to 
address the national policy and the parties’ intent arguments of 
Berschader and RosInvest; they also compare the interpretation of the 
consent clause in Berschader and European Media Ventures.  Also, 
while the Tza tribunal seems to have compiled and used all decisions 
available on narrow consent clauses, the Renta4 tribunal, first examined 
                                                 
225 Monika C E. Heymann, International Law and the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes relating to China, JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
LAW 11(3), 507-526 (2008); Kim M. Rooney, ICSID and BIT Arbitrations and 
China, 24 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 24(6) 689-712 (2007); 
Stephan W. Schill, Tearing down the Great Wall: the New Generation 
Investment Treaties of the People’s Republic of China, CARDOZO J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 73-118 (2007); Peter J. Turner, Investor-State Arbitration, in 
MANAGING BUSINESS DISPUTES IN TODAY’S CHINA – DUELLING WITH DRAGONS, 
233-258, Kluwer Law International ed. 2007.  
226 Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, 
Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence, ¶ 170 (Feb. 12, 2007).  
227 Id. ¶ 171-72. 
228 The Tza decision devoted an entire section to other awards at the end 
of its reasoning, while the Renta4 decision integrated the decisions in its 
reasoning. 
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the weight of Berschader and RosInvest and determined those two 
cases do not carry any stare decisis. None of the awards were decided 
on jurisdiction solely based on a narrow scope of the consent clause. As 
noted by the Renta4 tribunal, in Berschader the tribunal had already 
reached the decision to decline jurisdiction based on the lack of direct 
investment on the part of the claimants before examining the consent 
issue.
229
 In RosInvest, the tribunal declined jurisdiction on the scope of 
the consent clause but retained jurisdiction on the MFN clause.
230
 
Referring to Berschader and RosInvest’s findings on the reflection 
of a “national policy,” the Tza tribunal departed to reach the conclusion 
that nothing allowed them to interpret the narrow consent clause as a 
reflection of the intent of the parties and a national policy of communist 
countries:  
[T]he tribunal in Berschader maintained that ‘the 
restrictive wording (of Article 10) arose from the 
deliberate intention of the Contracting Parties to 
limit the scope of the arbitration under the Treaty’ 
(emphasis added).  
The Tribunal seems to reach such conclusion by 
comparing the wording of the BIT in question with 
that of posterior treaties and by so doing infers the 
purpose of the wording in the Belgium/Luxembourg 
– USSR BIT. We find in the award no other 
indication that the parties had such an intention nor 
any clear statement of policy of either party proving 
such intention. 
Similarly, in RosInvest Respondent argued that it 
seemed that certain aspects of the national policy of 
the former Soviet Union should be considered as a 
determining factor of what it may agree or not in 
                                                 
229 Renta 4 S.V.S.A et al. v. Russian Federation, Arb Inst. of Stockholm 
Chamber of Commerce, Award on Preliminary Objections, Case No. V 
024/2007, ¶ 23 (Mar. 20, 2009). (“The impact of Berschader’s consideration of 
this point [consent clause] is attenuated by the fact that its conclusion was 
superfluous . . . . [The arbitrators’] conclusion was that there was no 
jurisdiction with respect to the claimants’ indirect investment. The door had 
therefore already been shut on the claimants by the time the arbitrators next 
turned to consider the phrase ‘amount or mode of compensation’. Their 
conclusions in this regard may be considered obiter.”).  
230 Id. ¶ 48 (“It is also noteworthy that the tribunal at any rate found that 
it had jurisdiction on another ground (MFN)”).  
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specific bilateral treaties. The Award, however, does 
not prove that Respondent has produced tangible 
evidence of such national policies. In any case, the 
Tribunal seems to have placed little importance to 
these arguments.
231
 
The Renta4 tribunal was also skeptical of considering the 
intentions of one of the parties to a BIT.  They found no evidence that 
the policy of the Soviet Union was consistent in the various BITs 
concluded during that period.  They also found no evidence of official 
Spanish comment directly on point.
232
 
Equally interesting, the Tza and Renta4 tribunals lean on the 
absence of objection from the host state. In those cases, involving 
narrow consent clauses, (Telenor v Hungary and Saipem v Bangladesh 
the consent clause was limited to expropriation claims) the Tribunals 
question the existence of such a national policy: 
Surprisingly, none of these awards analyze the 
alleged national policy arguments. On the contrary, 
as in the famous mystery that was solved with the 
clue of the ‘dog that had not barked,’ it seems that 
none of the governments (two of which, Hungary and 
Russia, were communist states) had even tried to 
argue that the expressions ‘involving compensation’ 
or ‘involving the amount of compensation’ 
established public policies and the parties' intention 
to exclude all legal issues related to expropriation 
from the consent to international arbitration. Had the 
restrictive interpretation been the result of a policy 
deeply enrooted (and presumably hard to negotiate), 
it would have been unlikely that the involved 
governments had decided not to discuss it.
233
 
In Tza and Renta4 the tribunals criticise Berschader’s analysis, or 
lack of analysis, in interpreting the consent clause. In particular, it is 
not decisive in the Tza tribunal’s view that the enlargement of the scope 
from “dispute on the amount of compensation” to “any dispute” in 
subsequent treaties helps to explain, in retrospect, the nuance of the 
                                                 
231 Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, 
Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence, ¶ 174-75 (Feb. 12, 2007).  
232 Renta4, ¶ 51-53.  
233 Tza, ¶ 176. 
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meaning of “amount of the compensation” differently than “any issue 
on compensation including entitlement.”234 
These findings should be approved. While there was a change in 
the wording of the consent clause in Chinese BIT to enlarge it from 
“dispute on the amount of compensation” to “any dispute,” such a 
change cannot itself constitute sufficient proof to restrict in retrospect 
the meaning of “dispute on the amount to compensation” and exclude 
the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal.  However, the comparison of the 
wording of consent clauses contained in other treaties signed by the 
host state becomes significantly more relevant when the investor seeks 
the application of those clauses by means of the most favored nation 
clause mechanism. 
 
D.  MOST FAVORED NATION CLAUSE AND JURISDICTIONAL EXTENSION 
BITs frequently contain most favored nation (MFN) clauses.  
These terms are to ensure that the host state does not discriminate 
among nationals of different countries.  These clauses require the host 
state to treat a foreigner from one country no less favorably than it 
treats foreigners from another country under their separate BITs.  If the 
host state provides better treatment to other foreigner investors, it must 
increase the level of treatment to all foreigners no matter that their BIT 
may have more restrictive terms.   
MFN clauses are found in international trade treaties dating back to 
the 18
th
 Century.
235
 Their scopes vary and are subject to interpretation.  
The subject matter of the state’s duty may extend to provide 
“treatment” no less favorable than, or it may be limited to “activities” 
in connection with the investment.
236
 It may also be limited to the 
                                                 
234 Tza, ¶ 185. 
235 Treaty of the Bogue, China – Gr. Brit, art. VIII, Oct. 8, 1843 (“The 
Emperor of China having been graciously pleased to grant, to all foreign 
countries, whose Subjects, or Citizens, have hitherto traded at Canton the 
privilege of resorting for purposes of Trade to the other, four Ports of Fuchow, 
Amoy, Ningpo and Shanghai, on the same terms as the English, it is further 
agreed, that should the Emperor hereafter, from any cause whatever, be pleased 
to grant, additional privileges or immunities to any of the subjects or Citizens 
of such Foreign Countries, the same privileges and immunities will be extended 
to and enjoyed by British Subject. . . .” ) 
236 See Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments, Ger.- China, art. 3.2, 3.2, Dec. 1, 2003, 2362 U.N.T.S. 253 
(stating that each contracting party shall accord to investments and activities 
associated with such investments by the investors of the other Contracting 
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treatment of investors after the admission of the investment, or extend 
to admission and establishment of the investment.
237
 It may cover “all 
matters,” or an enumerative list of “matters” under the BIT.238 For 
instance, in the UK-China BIT the MFN clause covers “treatment” in 
general:  
Investments by investors of either Contracting State 
in the Territory of the other Contracting State shall 
not be subjected to a treatment less favorable than 
that accorded to investments by investors of third 
States.
239
 
In the Peru-China 1994 BIT, the scope of the MFN clause was 
limited to the guarantee of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ (FET) and 
provided: 
1. Investments and activities associated with 
investments of investors of either Contracting Party 
shall be accorded fair and equitable treatment and 
shall enjoy protection in the territory of the other 
Contracting Party. 
2. The treatment and protection referred to in para. 1 
of this article shall not be less favorable than that 
accorded to investments and activities associated 
with such investment of investors of a third state.
240
 
The identification of the protections that can be included in the 
terms ‘treatment and protection’ has been the subject of extensive 
investment tribunal jurisprudence for the last ten years.  While the 
                                                                                                 
Party treatment not less favorable than that accorded to investments and 
activities by its own investors or investors of any third State); Agreement on 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, China- Neth., art. 
3.3, Nov. 26, 2001, 2369 U.N.T.S. 219.  
237 China does not grant any treatment before admission and approval. 
238 Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments, China- Japan, art. 3.1, Aug. 27, 1988, 1555 U.N.T.S. 197 (“The 
treatment accorded by either Contracting Party within its territory to nationals 
and companies of the either Contracting Party with respect to investments, 
returns and business activities in connection with the investments shall not be 
less favorable than that accorded to nationals and companies of any third 
state”). 
239 Agreement on Mutual Protection of Investment, China-Swed., art. 2.2, 
Mar. 29, 1982, 1350 U.N.T.S. 247. 
240 China-Peru BIT, supra note 12, art.3.  
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application of the MFN clause to substantive protections has not been 
contested, its extension to procedural rights, such as access to 
international arbitration, has been debated and was one of the issues 
before the Tza tribunal.  Mr. Tza sought to avoid the limited scope of 
the dispute resolution clause under the Peru-Chinese BIT by 
incorporating in reliance to the above MFN clause the more favorable 
dispute resolution clause in the third party treaty, the Peru-Columbia 
BIT (which allowed arbitration over any disputes). 
The core of the developing case law, to which Tza brought its 
contribution, is the extent to which an investor may use the MFN clause 
of the basic treaty to incorporate the more favorable procedural 
protection of a third party BIT to improve its procedural treatment.
241
 In 
connection with procedural rights, MFN treatment has been granted by 
arbitral tribunals to circumvent procedural requirements of the basic 
treaty such as the observance of a cooling off period
242
 or the 
exhaustion of local remedies.
243
 The great leap forward consisted for 
foreign investors in seeking the use of MFN clauses in order to gain 
access to international arbitration, when the basic treaty provided for 
ad-hoc arbitration only or included a limited consent clause.   
Ten years ago, when China was renegotiating its older form BITs 
(in particular the new Netherlands and German BITs) the question 
arose among commentators on the use of the MFN clauses to 
incorporate better dispute resolution clauses in order to circumvent the 
                                                 
241 See DUGAN ET AL., supra note 79, at 413-25; Schreuer, Consent to 
Arbitration, supra note 81, at 851-61;Yas Banifatemi, The Emerging 
Jurisprudence on the Most Favored Nation Treatment in Investment 
Arbitration, INVESTEMENT TREATY LAW: CURRENT ISSUES III, 
REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, EMERGING 
JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW (British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law ed., 2009) (R 15.5.1); Claire 
Crepet Daigremont, L’Extension Jurisprudentielle de la Competence des 
Tribunaux Arbitraux, LESASPECTS NOUVEAUX DU DROIT DES 
INVESTISSEMENTS INTERNATIONAUX (2007)(R. 15.5.1); Julie A. 
Maupin, MFN-Based Jurisdiction in Investor-State Arbitration: Is There Any 
Hope for a Consistent Approach?, 14 J. INT’L ECON. L. 157, 157-90 (2011). 
242 Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICISD Case No. ARB/97/7, Award, ¶ 
21 (Nov. 13, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 419 (2002) (R. 21.6). See LOWENFELD, 
supra note 2, at 572-77; BANIFATEMI, supra note 241. 
243 See Siemens v. Republic of Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, 
Decision on Jurisdiction (Aug. 3, 2004) (the scope of the MFN limits’ to 
“treatment” and “activities” in the basic BIT was sufficiently wide to include 
settlement of disputes (i.e. circumvent waiting periods)).  
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narrow consent clauses imposed by China.
244
 As noted above, oddly 
enough, the first time this mechanism was tested before arbitrators was 
the Tza case, for the benefit of a Chinese investment abroad. The use of 
the MFN clause in Tza will be examined in light of the solutions found 
in four other awards before which the issue was also raised: 
Berschader, Rosinvest, Renta4 and Austrian Airlines tribunals. The 
applicability of the MFN clause to procedural rights depends first on its 
scope and second on its interaction with the consent clause. 
 
1.  SCOPE OF THE MFN CLAUSE 
Access to international arbitration by use of the MFN clause 
initially resides in the interpretation of the scope of the MFN clause in 
the basic treaty.  Authors differentiate between clauses that cover 
“matters” or “treatments” under the BIT, or if the MFN protection is 
granted to investments or to investors.
245
  In Berschader, RosInvest and 
Austria Airline, the MFN clauses were broad, while in Tza and Renta4, 
the MFN protection was limited to the fair and equitable treatment.   
Therefore, in Tza and Renta4, the issue was whether the right to 
international arbitration is within the ambit of FET. The diversity of 
answers by tribunals based on their quite separate interpretations of 
similar language does not allow a definitive answer to predict the 
outcome of future disputes on this important issue.  Some authors speak 
of ‘incoherent decisions.’  For instance, in Plama Consortium v. 
Bulgaria, where the investor claimed access to ICSID arbitration in lieu 
of ad-hoc arbitration specified in the basic treaty, the arbitral tribunal 
held that the MFN protection covering “all matters” did not create 
access to ICSID arbitration.
246
  It concluded the MFN clause of the 
basic treaty must explicitly refer to investor-state dispute settlement.  In 
contrast, in Siemens v Argentina, which dealt with a MFN clause 
limited to FET, the tribunal held that such MFM protection allowed the 
                                                 
244 See Turner, supra note 101, at 233-58 (R.15.5.1, R 4); Heymann, 
supra note 64, at 507-26(R4); Rooney, supra note 66, at 707; Schill, supra note 
102, at 73-118; Aaron Chandler, BIT’s, MFN Treatment and the PRC: The 
Impact of China’s Ever Evolving Bilateral Investment Treaty Practice, 43 
INT’L LAW 1301, 1301-10 (2009)(R 16.4); Mark A. Cymrot, Investment 
Disputes with China, 61(3) DISP.RESOL J. 80, 80-7 (2006) (R 16.4).  
245 LOWENFELD, supra note 2, at 572.  
246 See Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulg., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/24. Decision on Jurisdiction, (Feb. 8, 2005), 44 ILM 721 (2005). 
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investor to circumvent a pre-arbitration cooling period by reference to a 
third party treaty without that requirement.
247
 
As to the extension of the scope of the consent clause to create 
jurisdiction, the issue has been examined with respect to broad FMN 
clauses as well as narrow ones.  
The Rosinvest tribunal had to examine a MFN clause covering both 
the treatment of “investments and returns” as well as “investors of the 
other Contracting Party, as regards their management, maintenance, 
use, enjoyment or disposal of their investors.”248 The tribunal 
distinguished between these two wordings and held that the former one 
did not include the protection by an arbitration clause covering 
expropriation: 
[I]t is difficult to doubt that, first, an expropriation is 
indeed a ‘treatment’ of the investment by the Host 
State. However, secondly, while the protection by an 
arbitration clause covering expropriation is a highly 
relevant aspect of that ‘treatment,’ if compared with 
the alternative that the expropriation of an investment 
can only be challenged before the national courts of 
the Host State, it does not directly affect the 
‘investment,’ but rather the procedural rights of the 
‘investor’ for whom paragraph (2) of Article 3 
provides a separate rule.
249
 
The latter wording, which granted the MFN protection to investors’ 
included, according to the Rosinvest tribunal, recourse to arbitration.  
While expropriation may interfere with an investors “use” and 
“enjoyment,” the ability to submit to arbitration becomes a critical part 
of the investors corresponding protection.  This allows the investor 
significant protection compared with the mere option of challenging the 
interference in the domestic courts of the host nation.
250
 
In Tza, the Chinese investor sought to have recourse by the MFN 
clause of the Peru China BIT to the dispute resolution clause provided 
for in a third party treaty, namely the Peru-Columbian 2001 BIT which 
                                                 
247 See Siemens, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction. 
248 UK-Soviet BIT, art. 3(1) & (2). 
249 RosInvest Co. UK Ltd. v. Russian Federation (RosInvest), Arb. Inst. 
Of Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Award on Jurisdiction, Case No. V 
079/2005, ¶ 127 (Oct. 2007). 
250 Id. ¶ 130. 
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covered “all legal disputes,”251 to broaden the scope of the jurisdiction 
of the arbitral tribunal. The MFN Clause in the China-Peru BIT was 
limited to FET and provided: 
1. Investments and activities associated with 
investments of investors of either Contracting Party 
shall be accorded fair and equitable treatment and 
shall enjoy protection in the territory of the other 
Contracting Party. 
2. The treatment and protection referred to in para. 1 
of this article shall not be less favorable than that 
accorded to investments and activities associated 
with such investment of investors of a third state.
252
 
The Tza tribunal interpreted this MFN clause under Article 31 of 
the VCLT, “in accordance with its ordinary meaning and having 
considered it in the light of the purpose of the BIT, it does not seem to 
restrict the scope of the word ‘treatment’ to such significant 
commercial matters as exploitation and investment management.”253  
The tribunal accepted that this wording covered access to international 
arbitration for violation of the fair and equitable treatment.
254
 They did 
not agree that it extended to disputes over expropriation. 
The Renta4 tribunal took the view that “treatment encompasses 
arbitration regardless of whether it relates to investments or investors” 
but, by a majority decision, found that the circumstance of that case did 
not allow the application of the MFN clause to enlarge the consent 
                                                 
251 Agreement on Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 
Peru-Colom., art. 12.1, 12.2, Apr. 26 1994, 2342 U.N.T.S. 181 (provided that 
any legal dispute between a Contracting Party and a national or company of the 
other Contracting Party in connection with the investments under this 
Agreement shall, as far as possible, be settled amicably between the parties to 
the dispute. If a dispute cannot be settled amicably between the parties to the 
dispute within three months from the date of written notice of the claim, the 
dispute may be submitted either to the competent court of the Contracting Party 
in whose the investment is located or to the international arbitration of the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (hereinafter referred 
to as the “Centre”).  
252 Peru-China BIT, supra note 12, at art.3. 
253 Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, 
Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence, ¶ 213 (Feb. 12, 2007).   
254 Id.  
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clause.
255
  As in Tza, the MFN clause in the Spanish-Russian BIT was 
found to apply to FET only, but the tribunal found that FET did not 
extend to international arbitration as opposed to domestic courts.
256
  
The question subsequently arose in Austrian Airlines where the 
applicable MFN of the basic treaty covered investors and “their 
investments treatment.”257 The Tribunal took the general view, in line 
with Maffezini and RosInvest and Renta4, that as a matter of principle 
MFN clauses may apply to dispute settlement clauses: 
As a general matter, the tribunal observes that it sees 
no conceptual reason why an MFN clause should be 
limited to substantive guaranties and rule out 
procedural protections, the latter being a means to 
enforce the former. The tribunal notes, in this 
connection, that the potential application of an MFN 
clause to procedural protections is widely accepted 
by investment tribunals. This view has been held 
mostly with respect to the avoidance of procedural 
requirements prior to commence arbitration, but also, 
more recently, with respect to the import of a dispute 
settlement clause.
258
 
 
2.  INTERACTION OF THE MFN CLAUSE WITH THE DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION CLAUSE 
Thus it appears that while recent decisions have acknowledged the 
principle that a MFN clause may extend to jurisdiction matters (Tza and 
Austrian Airlines), they nonetheless have refused its enforcement when 
interpreting this clause in the context of the wording of the dispute 
resolution clause.  
                                                 
255 Renta 4 S.V.S.A et al. v. Russian Federation, Arb Inst. of Stockholm 
Chamber of Commerce, Award on Preliminary Objections, Case No. V 
024/2007, ¶ 101 (Mar. 20, 2009).  
256 Agreement Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments, Spain-Russ, art. 5, Oct. 26, 1990, 1662 U.N.T.S. 199 (“(1) 
Treatment of Investments” provided “each party shall guarantee fair and 
equitable treatment within its territory for the investments made by investors of 
the other Party. (2) The treatment and protection referred to in paragraph 1 
above shall be not less favorable than that accorded by either Party to 
investments made its territory to investors of any third State”)). 
257 Austrian-Slovak BIT, art. 3. 
258 Austrian Airlines v. Slovak Republic (Austrian Airlines), 
UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶  124 (Oct. 9, 2009). 
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In Tza, the tribunal considered interpretation of the “general 
wording” of the MFN clause contrasted with the “specific wording” of 
the consent provision under Article 8(3) of the same BIT where the 
parties had “specifically established the possibility of submitting ‘other 
matters’ to ICSID arbitration” and “established specifically such 
occurrence in the wording of the BIT,” the clause prevented the 
incorporation of the more favorable clause found in the third party 
treaty.
259
  When referring to its “duty to give the BIT wording the 
meaning it was really intended,” the Tza tribunal held, “the specific 
wording of Article 8(3) should prevail over the general wording of the 
MFN clause in Article 3.5.”260 
A similar approach was adopted by the Austrian Airlines tribunal, 
which held that the specific intent of a narrow consent prevailed over 
the unspecific intent in the MFN clause: 
Faced with a manifest, specific intent to restrict 
arbitration to disputes over the amount of 
compensation doe expropriation to the exclusion of 
disputes over the principles of expropriation, it would 
be paradoxical to invalidate that specific intent by 
virtue of the general, unspecified intent expressed in 
the MFN clause…. The restrictive dispute settlement 
mechanism for expropriation claims set out in 
Articles 8, 4(4) and 4(5) constitutes an exception to 
the scope of Article 3(1). Hence, the MFN clause 
does not apply to the settlement of disputes over the 
legality of expropriations.
261
 
A different view was adopted in RosInvest, where the tribunal 
found that the limitations to the mechanism of the MFN clause were 
not to be found in the restrictive wording of the dispute resolution 
clause, but instead in the exceptions to the MFN clause listed in that 
                                                 
259 Peru-China BIT, supra note 12, at art.8.3 (“If a dispute involving the 
amount of compensation for expropriation cannot be settled within six months 
after resort to negotiations….[I]t may be submitted at the request of either party 
to the international arbitration of […] ICSID. Any disputes concerning other 
matters between an investor of either Contracting Party and the other 
Contracting Party may be submitted to the Centre if the parties to the dispute so 
agree.” (emphasis added)). 
260 Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, 
Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence, ¶ 216 (Feb. 12, 2007).  
261 Austrian Airlines v. Slovak Republic (Austrian Airlines), 
UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶  135 (Oct. 9, 2009). 
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very clause.  The tribunal found the MFN clause applied to the dispute 
resolution clause.
262
 
This view should be preferred to the dichotomy adopted in Tza and 
Austrian Airlines between specific and general consent wording. It is 
the wording of the MFN clause, which should contain its own 
limitations and exceptions.  Thus the preferred view should be to limit 
the scope of the MFN clause (i) in view of its wording and whether 
FET would encompass access to international arbitration, and (ii) in 
view of its own exceptions listed in that clause.  
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Future disputes involving China BITs are subject to uncertainty in 
outcome on the two major issues decided in Tza: (i) the scope of the 
consent clause in disputes over expropriation and (ii) the application of 
the MFN clauses on older generation BITs when the investor seeks the 
broader or more favorable procedural treatment of newer generation 
BITs.
                                                 
262 RosInvest Co. UK Ltd. v. Russian Federation (RosInvest), Arb. Inst. 
Of Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Award on Jurisdiction, Case No. V 
079/2005, ¶ 135 (Oct. 2007). “In view of the careful drafting of Article 8 
[dispute resolution clause] and the limiting language therein, it can certainly not 
be presumed that the Parties “forgot” arbitration when drafting and agreeing on 
Article 7 [MFN clause]. Had the Parties intended that the MFN-clauses should 
also not apply to arbitration, it would indeed have been easy to add a sub-
section (c) [exceptions] to that effect in Article 7. The fact that this was not 
done, in the view of the Tribunal, is further confirmation that the MFN-clauses 
in Article 3 are also applicable to submissions to arbitration in other Treaties.” 
